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Graduate education opportunities are important in the modern military because 
they are absolutely vital to American interests. A fully developed, highly educated officer 
corps is the backbone of a well-equipped and trained military force that can respond to 
crises around the globe. The rapid evolution of technology and politics, as well as 
military intervention into new mission areas where significant national interests are 
involved, requires those who will be directly involved be well-rounded and ready to 
respond to a myriad of previously civilian and diplomatic situations. In a military 
operation there is often little time to call in an expert for problem solving. The person on 
the scene must deal with it. 
The U.S. Navy typically offers funded graduate education to career-oriented 
officers after a fleet tour lasting about three to four years. This serves the dual purpose of 
rewarding the officer for a job well done and preparing him/her for greater 
responsibilities during follow-on tours. In many cases the funded education provides a 
sub-specialty code, which is required for the officer to be able to serve in specific jobs 
requiring extensive education or experience. Officers who undertake a funded graduate 
program will do so when they complete a fleet tour, when normally they will be a 
Lieutenant (pay grade O-3). They receive specialty pays and bonuses commensurate with 
their rank and community. They are also likely to be married (possibly with children), 
which further increases costs in the form of housing allowances and moving costs, as 
compared to single officers. 
A. VGEP/SCHOLARSHIP 
Though not a primary method of providing graduate education, there is a method 
for giving career-minded officers graduate education at a point earlier in their careers. 
This involves sending newly-commissioned officers back to school directly after 
commissioning. This provides the fleet with a graduate-educated officer at a more junior 
level, and allows the benefits of graduate education to be felt earlier in the officer’s 
career. Also, these junior officers are less likely to be married and to be drawing such 
specialty pays as flight pay, resulting in less-expensive transfer and allowance costs. 
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Also, the immediate start of graduate studies often fills time that is otherwise wasted 
awaiting service school start dates after Naval Academy graduation. 
Since the military recognizes the value of graduate education as a performance 
enhancer, a promotion tool, and a retention tool, it is important to determine whether 
Navy policies ensure maximum utilization of graduate education dollars. A very narrow 
portion of officer graduate education is facilitated through the U.S. Naval Academy. 
Newly commissioned officers from the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) can attend 
graduate school prior to their fleet tours through two separate programs, the Voluntary 
Graduate Education Program (VGEP) and the civilian scholarship graduate education 
program (to be listed throughout as Scholarship). Both programs are highly selective and 
accept only a few of the roughly 1000 USNA graduates every year. 
VGEP starts during the student’s last year at the USNA. If the first-class 
midshipman’s undergraduate academic and military schedule permits, graduate courses 
are taken at a local university, such as the University of Maryland. This gives the student 
a head start on graduate studies, more effectively filling the last year at USNA for those 
whose academic abilities allow more rapid completion of the rigorous undergraduate 
academic program. VGEP is largely composed of non-technical majors, owing to the 
shorter duration of the program. 
After graduation from USNA, students complete civilian graduate studies at the 
Navy’s expense with a cap of $10,000 in direct education costs. For most, the graduation 
date is the December following USNA graduation, a period of about seven months. The 
$10,000 cap currently covers the student’s education expenses at the University of 
Maryland. 
The Scholarship program takes place after graduation from USNA. Newly 
commissioned ensigns are allowed to accept civilian scholarships to graduate school. The 
government covers only pay and allowances. Students are not eligible for tuition 
assistance (TA) and must pay for any direct education costs that exceed the value of their 
scholarship. 
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Several prestigious graduate schools maintain a close working relationship with 
USNA in an attempt to lure highly qualified students to their institutions. Due to the 
quality of graduates and continuing success of the program, scholarships are often 
arranged through USNA connections. In short, the government reaps the benefit of the 
member earning a Master's degree from a prestigious university for only the cost of pay 
and benefits. In both programs, participants rejoin their warfare area training tracks after 
completing a Master's degree. 
Both of these programs require the selectee to agree to an additional service 
commitment in return for the graduate education. This commitment is governed by 
various instructions, depending on the officer’s community and program. However, the 
service commitment for VGEP and Scholarship runs concurrently with the officer’s 
USNA graduation minimum service requirement (MSR), which is generally five years 
from USNA graduation for all non-aviation officers. Thus, the shorter graduate education 
service requirement is often completed prior to the USNA graduation service 
requirement. At the conclusion of the five-year commissioned service (YCS) point, the 
officer can decide to leave the military, or stay Navy and continue to serve. 
At one extreme, a nuclear-trained submarine officer can complete a USNA 
undergraduate degree at a cost of around $250,000, and attend graduate school through 
the Scholarship program. This would be followed by well over a year of Navy nuclear 
power training and submarine school. This education and training sequence would take 
the officer so close to the MSR that the only required fleet service would be the military 
mandated “minimum activity tour” of two years. In this example, the Navy could have 
paid well over $500,000 dollars for education, training, and salary costs of an officer who 
would only spend two years in the fleet, which results in over $250,000 dollars invested 
per year of fleet service (not including salary and benefits for those two years of service). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to determine if there are any significant negative retention 
effects from granting graduate education too early in a career. With concurrent service 
requirements negating any of the required service extensions normally incurred for 
funded graduate education, it is possible that granting graduate education too early in an 
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officer's career may reduce retention by enhancing that officer's employability. In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the VGEP/Scholarship programs and determine their 
financial costs and benefits, this thesis will analyze the two programs for the USNA 
graduating classes of 1988-1996. Specifically, the thesis attempted to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Do VGEP/Scholarship graduates leave the naval service at a higher rate than 
their peers? 
2. Do the current VGEP and Scholarship programs represent an efficient use of 
resources? 
It is hoped that this study will be of use to Navy officer personnel planners as well 
as the U.S. Naval Academy Graduate Education Committee and Program Manager in 
assessing the overall benefits and costs of continuing the VGEP and Scholarship 
programs. Additionally, specific recommendations are made for program improvement. 
C. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Data for program participants and USNA graduating classes 1988-1996 was 
obtained through the USNA Office of Institutional Research Data Warehouse, which 
maintains a database on all aspects of USNA students and alumni. The data source for 
post-USNA events (retention) is the Navy Officer Master File. Statistical analysis of the 
data was conducted in an effort to test the research questions. Based on the research 
questions posed, a number of multiple regression models were estimated. Only officers 
for whom complete data could be obtained were analyzed. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
There were certain limitations to this study. This study consisted of USNA 
graduates 1988-1996 of all warfare specialties, except aviation. However, the thesis 
focused on Navy Unrestricted Line (URL) warfare communities. Due to the extended 
service requirements of the aviation field, the retention definition used for surface, SEAL, 
submarine, and other officers was determined not to be useful for aviators. Naval 
Aviators and Naval Flight Officers incurred longer minimum service requirements 
(MSR) due to the extensive, and costly, training pipeline. Though the aviation 
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community was the original impetus for the creation of the VGEP program in 1983, they 
were omitted from the analysis in this thesis. The justification for omitting aviators relies 
on the assumption that the longer required service period for aviators ensures a positive 
return on the investment in graduate education. 
Aside from warfare-community limitations, there are definite differences in the 
application and selection processes for the USNA and NROTC commissioning sources. 
Because officers from both commissioning sources are subject to the exact same 
conditions in the fleet, it is assumed that the results of this study will have some 
applicability to NROTC graduates. 
One confound noted during the time period of the study was the post-Cold War 
military force reductions, which also coincided with a rapidly expanding civilian job 
market. These two factors resulted in a large exodus of officers. Since officers in whom 
the Navy invested in graduate education would be of sufficient quality that they would 
not be intentionally forced out of the service, force reductions should not have had an 
influence on retention of graduate educated officers. Also, any effects from downsizing 
can be controlled in the regression models. Also, the planned low retention (downsizing) 
during the time period of this study would allow a conservative analysis in determining if 
the military’s best and most-educated were leaving the service to pursue civilian 
employment. With the Navy doing little to encourage  retention during this time, it can be 
assumed that the more marketable officers would be more susceptible to outside 
influences and be more likely to leave the service in search of civilian employment. 
Chapter III describes the statistical approach used to answer the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. The results of the retention analysis are presented in 
Chapter IV. These retention results are used to estimate cost savings to the government in 




























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter is intended to describe the current level of knowledge concerning 
graduate education in the military context. The major theme of this chapter revolves 
around a comprehensive review of published literature pertaining to military education, 
and specifically about the VGEP and Scholarship programs. Information is contained in 
this chapter in an attempt to contextualize the retention results to be found later and the 
resultant cost comparisons. 
A. EDUCATION VERSUS TRAINING 
The commonly accepted definition of training is instruction that teaches a skill, 
sequence or action such as cleaning or operating a weapon. Basically, training prepares 
one for an expected situation or action. Education, on the other hand, teaches a thought 
process, improving the ability to respond to broader and unforeseen situations. Education 
is more general in nature (Sarkesian, Williams, & Bryant, 1995, pp. 17, 65). Since 
foreign relations and policy are complex and ever changing, it does little good to impart 
an officer with a checklist of “if this, then that.” The officer must be able to recognize, 
understand and respond to changing environments in a responsible fashion while keeping 
mission and any constraints in mind. 
B. HISTORY OF MILITARY EDUCATION 
While officers need extensive training, education is more often seen as the key to 
promotion and responsibility. This is not a new concept, it has long been expected that a 
military officer be well educated in various fields. From the earliest days of the United 
States Navy, periods of inaction were strictly devoted to professional development and 
various missions were devised to test the abilities of officers to respond to the challenges 
of their office (McKee, 1991): 
It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable 
mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should 
be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctiliously 
courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor. -John Paul Jones, 18th 
Century American Naval Hero (U.S. Naval Academy, 2002a, p. 2). 
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We still continue perfectly idle so far as it relates to public service… We 
employ most of our time in reading and in endeavoring to acquire useful 
general and professional knowledge. LT Charles Morris, USN, 1808 
(personal letter from LT Morris to Noadiah Morris; quoted in McKee, 
1991, p. 214). 
The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between 
the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by 
fools and its thinking done by cowards. -19th Century British General Sir 
William Francis Butler (Bahnsen & Cone, 1990, p. 28). 
World War I showed the inadequacies of military preparations in training and 
officer development. Social selection of officers and antiquated aristocratic privileges 
crippled the efficiency and morale of western militaries (Ropp, 1987, p. 47). During the 
war, ill-prepared officers were consumed at such a rate that it was often difficult to fully 
man front-line units. Casualties were so severe in the British Army that second 
lieutenants often commanded battalions after battles. This was great for junior officer 
promotion, however, due to inadequacies in pre-war British officer development, there 
were few qualified officers to promote. 
The German officers did better in the field due to strict Prussian militaristic 
traditions prevalent in pre-war Germany that stressed and trained war fighting to an 
extreme (Demeter, 1935; Allard, 2000). Prussian General von Moltke repeatedly 
subjected the Prussian General Staff to realistic and demanding mobilization planning 
problems in an effort to round out the Prussian officer corps to prevent problems which 
could be exceptionally dangerous on the battlefield (Holley; taken from Allard 2000; 
Simons & Higham, 2000). As is now known, the Germans fell on their faces, not on the 
battlefield, but behind it, where General von Moltke had worked so hard to avert tragedy. 
The utter and complete lack of awareness of logistics, supply, and support cost the 
Germans dearly in Belgium during the first month of the war and nagged them ever after 
(Converse, 1998). The Germans could fight exceptionally well if they could get to the 
front with all of their equipment and adequate supplies. A lopsided officer corps was not 
as effective on the field as they were on the training grounds where problems are often 
solved with assumptions, calculations, and rules (Simons, 2000, p. 136). 
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After World War I, and with the advent of the technology boom of the 20th-
Century, it became as important to master technology and equipment as the “art” of 
command and warfare. Morris Janowitz, a noted American military sociologist states, 
“Perhaps it would be more accurate to conclude that European military professionals 
fought to maintain their social position by monopolizing officership until their numbers 
ran out, and until they were displaced by the ever-increasing need for technical experts” 
(Janowitz, 1960, np). The huge casualty rates of “old-school” officers and lessons learned 
in the first largely modern (by today’s standards), highly mechanized war served to start 
the transformation of European military powers. 
Accordingly, training and schooling became more centralized and formalized. 
The social selection of officers stopped for the most part in Western powers. Officers 
were largely selected based on merit or professional qualifications, such as graduation 
from a military academy or officer training course. Active officers were starting to be 
formally schooled upon their indoctrination to be somewhat skilled in their profession 
before being sent to front line units. This greatly improved their overall competency, 
though the reserve officers who would fill wartime ranks were often not as proficient or 
qualified (Converse, 1998). Unfortunately, the United States military retained the 
antiquated, seniority-based promotion system until World War II, limiting the influence 
of new blood within the officer corps. The U.S. military seniority-based promotion 
system was changed during World War II and officially modified into the modern version 
in 1947 (Janowitz, 1960, p. 62). 
Officers generally acquitted themselves well on all sides during the World War II, 
having taken the dear lessons of World War I to heart. This is not to say that nothing was 
learned. World War II was a technology revolution of its own. The first atomic weapons 
were used, the first jet aircraft, the first cruise missile, the first ballistic missile, and the 
first guided missiles, among other innovations. Technology allowed man to kill each 
other in ways never before dreamed of, though the overall war was largely decided in the 
old-fashioned way with large armies in the field and fleets at sea. 
After the war, Allied military officials were confronted with a whole new range of 
problems created by the total destruction of enemy homelands. Social, political, and 
 10
economic problems were the order of the day. Janowitz noted in that the increased 
technology and complexity of military operations increased the importance of the 
“military manager” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 22). Officers were 
…coping with problems of supply, and industrial mobilization, 
administering occupied territories. Many military professionals came to 
realize that… subjects such as economics, comparative government, 
international relations, and foreign languages should be regarded as staples 
rather than frills in a program of military education (Lovell, 1979, np). 
These sentiments were echoed 40 years later, “The unique nature of many of these 
[military operations other than war]… may require adjustments not only in military 
doctrine, but also in the military’s combat-oriented warrior mentality” (Franke, 1999, p. 
2).  Evolving technology and tactics had an affect on the expected operations, “Joint 
commanders in future operations will… be expected to focus the technologies and 
practices of operations security, deception, electronic warfare, and even psychological 
operations through tightly integrated campaign plans” (JCS, 1994; quoted in Allard, 
2000, np). This was more or less Allied confirmation of the German lessons of World 
War I. 
After World War II as the education level of Americans in general rose, the 
military turned to university-level education to solve some of these problems. Officers 
were recruited from many fields other than military science. Additional specialized 
training was also seen as desirable. As early as 1973, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense was attempting to get the benefits of widespread graduate education into the 
American Officer Corps. The Assistant Secretary of Defense also noted that the U.S. 
military was not fully utilizing the skills of graduate degrees that officers already held 
(Office of Assistant. Secretary of Defense, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, 1973). 
C. MODERN TRENDS 
The lessons of the first half of the 20th Century clearly demonstrated the need for 
military professionals in areas other than actual combat. Military professionals, or at least 
a visible portion of them, need to be skilled in fields beyond tactics and strategy. Fields 
such as economics, manpower, transportation, medicine, business and many others may 
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be required in the course of military duty. These other requirements had the effect of 
civilianizing the military. 
However, was bringing in specialties other than actual combat a threat to the 
‘warrior spirit” within our military? Janowitz (1960) believed not, citing the example of 
World War II when numerous warriors and other professions coexisted so harmoniously 
and effectively that the services all maintained their own semi-autonomous research 
centers after the war. He stated that it was “…possible for one man to embody both roles, 
and World War II did produce a number of officers of this variety” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 
36). 
As a counterpoint, Moskos and Wood introduced the “institutional/occupational” 
thesis in 1977 which discusses whether the military was and should have been more 
institutional, espousing high values and esprit de corps, or should have been more 
occupational as were many European militaries where unionization and self-interests 
largely affect the military populations (Moskos & Wood, 1988, p. 3). “The occupational 
model implies the priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization.” 
Moskos and Wood have identified certain traits among Air Force officers who saw 
themselves as “specialists” (rather than officers), thus subscribed to the occupational 
model. Among those traits was decreased loyalty to the organization, lower retention and 
increased dissatisfaction with real or perceived differences between their positions and 
comparable civilians (Moskos & Wood, 1988, pp. 32-34). 
Not only has our view of officer education been molded by past events, but even 
future events promise to be demanding on the professional development of officers. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, noted in 1995, “The security 
challenges of a largely bipolar world have been replaced with more ambiguous and, in 
some cases, equally dangerous problems” (Franke, 1999, p. 1). The military is 
increasingly involved in operations other than destroying an enemy on the battlefield. 
Secretary of Defense Perry said in a 1996 address, “…you face the challenges of being a 
warrior, a statesman, a technological innovator, a manager, a coalition builder and a 
leader… (Franke, 1999, p. 13). Janowitz mirrored these sentiments (Janowitz, 1960, p. 
34, 70). 
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The modern military is involved in numerous operations, many of them new, 
untried missions that are aimed at preventing wars or restoring a fractured peace. 
“Between 1988 and 1996, seventeen new [United Nations] peacekeeping operations were 
conducted… That is more than the number of UN operations in the preceding four 
decades” (Dandeker & Gow, 1997, p. 327). But, is a military largely trained to face the 
Soviet Red Army in Western Europe suited for these missions? Many modern thinkers 
and policy makers have doubts that a solely battle-trained force will make effective 
peace-keepers for they often lack the skills required to prevent the battle they are trained 
to fight (Meeker & Segal, 1987; Segal & Segal, 1993: Miller & Moskos, 1995; Sarkesian, 
Williams, & Bryant, 1995; Franke, 1997). 
As noted by Secretary of Defense Cheney, 
[Military officers] represent the human capital that will sustain the global 
leadership of the United States and secure its role as the world’s sole 
remaining superpower into the twenty-first century. The demands placed 
on these officers, and the myriad of challenges they will confront, have 
rarely been higher (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 
1997, p. ix). 
With the dawning of the 21st Century, broad based Professional Military 
Education (PME) and graduate education are firmly established in our military. There are 
increasing numbers of ways to obtain a graduate degree for today’s officer and the need 
for that graduate degree is clear. 
Today, a young [Army] Captain standing at a road juncture between 
formerly warring parties in Bosnia is equal parts soldier, diplomat, 
negotiator, provider of humanitarian relief, and law enforcer. In the future, 
he will have to deal with such things as information warfare and cyber 
crime. Better equipping him to fulfill each of those roles and 
responsibilities will be a key challenge facing the PME [Professional 
Military Education] system. (CSIS, 1997, np). 
 
D. GRADUATE EDUCATION 
If the US military values fresh ideas and innovation, advanced education is one 
avenue to pursue it. The education is of considerable value in and of itself, but the 
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process by which a graduate degree program challenges the individual spark the ideas of 
innovation. Often, military degree seekers work the actual problems confronting their 
organizations. Naval Postgraduate School and Naval Academy faculty and graduate 
students have written thousands of graduate research theses and dissertations testing 
various hypotheses and scenarios on every topic from retention to combat effectiveness. 
The Naval War College fought the “Imperial Japanese Navy” 127 times in war games 
prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor. Their detailed games resulted in the 1934 
recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operations to “plan for a four-year conflict that 
would involve the progressive seizures of island bases in the Marshalls, Carolinas, and/or 
Mariannas (CSIS, 1997, p. 14). Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz remarked of their efforts, 
“The [war college] courses were so thorough that, after the start of World War II, nothing 
that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected except the kamikazes” (quoted in 
CSIS, 1997, p. 14). 
Without this professionally encouraged personal academic and mental challenge, 
the military would not lean towards innovation: “Whether the problem is missiles or 
manpower, planning toward the future tends to be a projection of existing trends, rather 
than an imaginative emphasis on revolutionary developments” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 28). 
Going back to the institutional/occupational argument, William Clover and 
Thomas McCloy of the US Air Force Academy staff have noted decreasing institutional 
values the longer a student remained at the Academy. This is possibly due to the 
individualistic nature of the rigorous academic curriculum (Moskos & Wood, 1988, p. 9). 
It stands to reason that placing students into an additional challenging academic 
environment would only reinforce the individual achievement. Remembering that 
individualism over unit is the tenet of the occupational model, would occupational values 
be increasing at the expense of institutional values if graduate education were widely 
offered? 
The added value of a graduate degree has been seen in Navy officer promotion 
and screening patterns for quite some time (Steiner, 1986; Talaga, 1994; Fuchs, 1996; 
Philips, 2001; Bowman & Mehay, 1998 & 2002). But what about the civilian sector? 
Would it not be reasonable to expect that a graduate degree would be beneficial to 
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corporate America also? With the booming economy of the 1990s and rising civilian 
salaries it could be surmised that well-educated officers likely have promising career 
opportunities in the outside world. With emphasis on higher education, is the Navy 
supplying corporate America with not only great leaders, but highly educated ones as 
well? Evidence overwhelmingly points to a “no” on this question. Officers with graduate 
degrees tend to stay in service longer than non-graduate educated officers (Steiner, 1986; 
Bowman & Mehay 1998, 2002). DuMont (1997) postulated, based on exit data, that 
postgraduate education could actually serve as a retention enhancement tool within the 
Surface Warfare Officer community. Bowman & Mehay (2002) showed that graduate 
education serves as an extremely cost-effective retention tool. Oddly, offering graduate 
education, an individual challenge and reward, increases institutional loyalty in the form 
of performance, promotion and retention. 
Another potentially significant benefit of investing in civilian graduate education, 
versus military graduate programs like Naval Postgraduate School and various command 
and staff colleges, is the impact on the military-civilian gap. Wars of self-defense like 
World War II are generally popularly supported since the need for military action is clear 
and significant national security and defense implications are at stake. 
As military interventions move more towards operations-other-than-war, public 
support often wanes because of ill-defined political objectives, especially if American 
casualties start mounting. Having military exposure to large numbers of future civilian 
leaders, as in the graduate school environment, puts a face on the uniform. Large scale 
civilian exposure to the military’s best and brightest presents the military as qualified, 
motivated, human and above all, American. For a civilian graduate student with no other 
personal military connection, being able to relate in a positive manner to a classmate who 
happens to be a Naval officer may prove central to their opinion of the military. These are 
the educated members of our society who largely influence American public opinion. 
This idea was successfully tested in mid-1800s Italy sparking interest in France by 
the 1870s. The idea was shelved for a generation due to lack of interest. When finally 
implemented, the originally intended benefits of military-civilian cross education were 
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lost to inept planning and overemphasis on full military honors and tradition (Ropp, 
1987, p. 125). 
According to research, the need for graduate education for military officers is 
clear. What is less clear is the research to substantiate the specific attributes of officers 
which are provided solely by graduate education and not related to other factors. 
Basically, at this time, it has been proven that graduate education is needed, but it has not 
been proven that the emphasis on graduate education actually solves the operational 
problems for which it is sought (Talaga, 1994). Sarkesian (1995) noted the lack of 
research on the effects of military graduate education makes literature review and 
summarizing the current status of knowledge on the subject difficult. 
E. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The time period of 1993-2003 is crucial. Not only is this the window of 
opportunity for USNA graduates within the research time period to leave the service, but 
also it corresponds with very low unemployment rates in the civilian sector. It is entirely 
possible that this demand for skilled labor in the civilian world pulled officers out of the 
military in search of higher paying, less demanding civilian jobs. If true, this would tend 
to make this study more conservative since it is assumed that highly educated officers 
with high USNA class rankings would be in top demand whatever the job market, but 
even more so in the hiring frenzy of the mid to late 1990s. 
F. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Sample data was analyzed in a series of binary logistic regressions. There are four 
main assumptions that are required for regression analysis. They are as follows: 
1. The response y can be represented by the probabilistic model: 
y=ß0 + ß1x + ε 
2. x is measured without error. 
3. ε is a random variable such that, for a given value of x, 
  E(ε)=0 and ơ2ε=ơ2 
and all pairs εi, εj are independent in a probabilistic sense. 
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4. For a given value of x, ε possesses a normal probability distribution 





















III. DATA ANALYSIS 
The literature review conducted above focused on military graduate education, the 
history behind it and the need for it. Converse (1997) is the most comprehensive study of 
the military education requirements facing the modern military. Others, including 
Janowitz (1960), Moskos & Wood (1988), Segal (1993), and Sarkesian (1995), all 
support the theory of a well-rounded, highly educated corps of officers leading well-
educated troops.  
Moskos & Wood (1988), Segal (1993), and Converse (1998) all felt in the modern 
era of limited, or low-intensity warfare, to achieve limited political goals, military 
leaders’ intellectual and management abilities would be more important to individual 
officers in the field. Whereas previous eras of total warfare centered on the absolute 
destruction of the enemy force and/or homeland, modern warfare is often waged with the 
specific goal of preserving the opposing force’s infrastructure, economic assets and 
resources. In short, the military needs to be able to do more than simply fight. Modern 
peacekeeping operations require patience, understanding, and education in order to meet 
the needs of the parties involved instead of merely responding to the violence displayed. 
One secondary benefit of graduate education is the increased institutional loyalty 
shown by recipients of military funded programs. Focusing largely on the Navy, a 
number of retention and promotion studies conclude that graduate education enhances 
selection to higher positions and promotion opportunities for Navy officers at various 
points in their careers (Jordan (1991), Talaga (1994), Fuchs (1996), Bowman & Mehay 
(1999; 2002) Phillips (2001)). Also, the studies show that Navy recipients tend to stay in 
service longer, perhaps feeling that the institution values their service as shown by the 
Navy’s willingness to fund education costs. Documented comparisons also exist in the 
Army (Sarkesian, Williams, & Bryant, 1995). 
What has not been adequately explored within the Navy is whether or not the 
graduate degree actually meets the requirement for which it exists (beyond, of course, 
keeping highly qualified and motivated officers in the service). There is limited research 
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on the subject of whether graduate education actually produces any noticeable changes in 
job performance or habits. It is difficult to determine what changes in individual officers 
result from the graduate education experience, and what are characteristics inherent in the 
top performers the military sends to graduate school. Some performance changes can be 
seen immediately after the experience, but both time and distance and lack of immersion 
within the specialty tend to attenuate performance effects. One result of graduate 
education cited by officers was their ability to understand the “big picture” and their roles 
and responsibilities within the military (Sarkesian, Williams, & Bryant, 1995). 
What has not been studied extensively is the effect of offering of graduate 
education early in the career prior to fleet or field service. Naval Academy graduate 
education opportunities in the form of VGEP and Scholarships were examined by 
Bowman (2000), who determined that 1983-1989 recipients of VGEP were less likely 
than their peers to remain in service to the O-4 (LCDR) board. In Bowman’s study, 
participants in both early graduate education programs have higher separation rates than 
the comparison group. Jordan (1991) found a similar result where graduate education in 
general had a negative impact on retention prior to the LCDR screening (at 
approximately 9.5 YCS). 
A. CONTENT EXPERTS 
The Scholarship program operates Navy-wide and as such there are several 
Scholarship content experts within the Navy. However, USNA receives the vast majority 
of Scholarship quotas. Moreover, VGEP is a Naval Academy-only program. At USNA, 
the VGEP and Scholarship programs are administered for the Academic Dean and 
Provost, Dr. William C. Miller, through the Graduate Education Committee (GEC). The 
Graduate Education Program Manager is Ms. Marjorie Roxburgh (USNA, 2002c). Ms. 
Roxburgh has 40 years of USNA experience including 20 years as the Graduate 
Education Program Manager. 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE 
The major goal of this study is to analyze the retention experience of USNA 
alumni who participated in early graduate education programs. Both fleet data and USNA 
historical data were needed for this analysis. The length of active service of each USNA 
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graduate was obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) through the 
USNA Office of Institutional Research (OIR). Naval Academy graduate information was 
obtained from the historical records maintained in the Institutional Research Data 
Warehouse. The records of VGEP and Scholarship participants were supplied by the 
USNA Graduate Education Program Manager and compared against the independently 
collected Bowman (2000) data set. 
It is this study’s contention that the USNA graduate whose final graduation Order 
of Merit (OOM) places him at the bottom of the class should not be included in the 
comparison group of those selected for immediate graduate education. They share a 
common graduation date and possibly even a common Naval Academy experience, but 
those at the top of the class are much different from those who barely graduate. More 
important, those with a high OOM (low class rank) do not qualify for immediate 
selection to graduate education programs. 
It was decided that due to the relatively small number of program participants in a 
given year, a time period spanning multiple years would be used to increase the size of 
the sample. The years 1988 through 1996 were chosen because this contains a sufficient 
number of graduates and program participants and all have passed the six-year retention 
window. The research time period was also selected to be as recent as data collection 
would allow, therefore improving generalization of the results to the current population. 
The retention of program participants was compared to the retention behavior of selected 
comparison groups (results presented in Chapter 4). In addition to the statistical analysis, 
a cost-benefit analysis of the two graduate programs is performed (with results presented 
in Chapter V). 
Due to the large number of USNA graduates over the nine-year period (N=9004), 
any data that must be deleted should not affect results so long as it does not pertain to a 
VGEP or Scholarship recipient (N=312). Reasonable efforts were made to identify and 
correct all missing or miscoded data. Dropping observations due to incomplete data was 
presumed to have a negligent impact on overall results. 
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This study focused specifically on USNA graduates so all midshipmen within the 
Brigade who failed to graduate for any reason were eliminated from the sample. There 
were 99 late graduates who had an OOM of zero, making OOM comparisons invalid for 
them. As graduates, they were retained in the data set but were placed in the lowest 
category for peer rankings (Top 1000). One Scholarship recipient was categorized as a 
late graduate. 
All USNA graduates who service selected Marine Corps were dropped due to the 
belief that USMC culture is sufficiently different from that of the Navy and retention 
factors would differ from those of Navy officers. This resulted in elimination of 1259 
officers, including 20 program participants (11 VGEP/9 Scholarship). A total of 132 
international students and inter-service transfer students were dropped from the data set, 
none of whom were program participants. Additionally, 18 USNA graduates who were 
not commissioned were also dropped. 
After dropping observations for the above reasons, the sample included 8854 
graduates, all of whom were commissioned into the Navy. There were 292 program 
participants in the population divided into 112 VGEP and 180 Scholarship recipients. 
All aviation selectees (pilots and naval flight officers) were eliminated due to the 
extended MSR associated with aviation service. Aviation selectees’ minimum service 
requirements extend well beyond the six-year research window making all retention 
comparisons invalid for them. This resulted in a loss of 2805 members, including 87 
program participants (40 VGEP/47 Scholarship). Another 19 officers were eliminated 
due to incomplete data pertaining to community selection. Another four non-participants 
were eliminated because of incomplete data concerning USNA major (two others fitting 
this description had been previously eliminated with other elimination categories). 
It is known that at least seven VGEP recipients failed to graduate with a Master's 
degree prior to USNA detachment at the end of their graduate education window (USNA, 
1990, 1991, 1992, 1994). It is possible there was a similarly small percentage of 
Scholarship students who also failed to graduate before returning to duty at the end of 
their graduate education window. It was decided to retain those students as program 
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participants even though they did not receive a degree because they imposed costs on the 
Navy in the form of money and time away from fleet duty. They were not distinguished 
in any way in the data set or analyses. 
It is also known that two members of the Class of 1990 started VGEP but were 
subsequently selected for the Scholarship program. They were defined as Scholarship 
program participants and dropped from the VGEP group since they incurred more 
government costs, both time and money, during their Scholarship program participation. 
The final data set contained 4752 officers, including 72 VGEP and 133 
Scholarship participants. This was the sample that was statistically analyzed. 
C. VARIABLES 
Data from the USNA-OIR and DMDC files was used to create several variables 
for analysis. The new variables are described in Table 1. 
Table 1 Variable Description. 
            IN@6YRS: =1 if member on active duty 6 yrs after USNA graduation, =0 if 
not on active duty 
MINORITY: =1 if non-Caucasian, =0 if Caucasian 
FEMALE: =1 if female, =0 if male 
VGEP:  =1 if VGEP participant, =0 if not a VGEP participant 
SCHOLAR: =1 if a Scholarship participant, =0 if not a Scholarship participant 
ATHLETE: =1 if member was USNA varsity letter winner, =0 if not a varsity 
letter winner 
OOM100: =1 if in top 100 of USNA OOM, =2 if in top 200, =3 if in top 300, 
=4 if in top 400, =5 if in top 500. 
SWO:  =1 if conventional Surface Warfare Officer, =0 if not SWO 
NSWO: =1 if Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear), =0 if not NSWO 
NSUB: =1 if Submarine Warfare Officer (Nuclear), =0 if not NSUB 
SPEC:  =1 if SEAL or Special Operations Officer, =0 if not SPEC 
OCOMM*: =1 if other community (General Unrestricted Line and all 
Restricted Line Officers), =0 if not OCOMM 
GROUP1: =1 if USNA Group 1 Major (engineering), =0 if not GROUP1 
GROUP2: =1 if USNA Group 2 Major (sciences), =0 if not GROUP2 
GROUP3: =1 if USNA Group 3 Major (humanities), =0 if not GROUP3 
YR88:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1988, =0 if not 
YR89:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1989, =0 if not 
YR90:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1990, =0 if not 
YR91:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1991, =0 if not 
YR92:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1992, =0 if not 
YR93:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1993, =0 if not 
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YR94:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1994, =0 if not 
YR95:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1995, =0 if not 
YR96:  =1 if member of USNA Class of 1996, =0 if not 
             
*Note: The OCOMM variable contains all officers not contained in other warfare variables. Communities include General 
Unrestricted Line (28), Medical (75), Oceanography (9), Supply (16), Civil Engineer (29), Intelligence (16), and Cryptology (8). 
 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
To determine the comparison group for graduate education participants, the 
selection OOM were analyzed to determine the OOM of selectees and non-selectees. A 
clear breakpoint was found in selection OOM. This breakpoint was used to identify the 
members of the comparison group. 
The main research question:  “Do VGEP/Scholarship recipients leave the service 
at a higher rate than their peers?”  required estimation of a binary logistic model. 
Significance was set at 95% using a one-tail criterion of significance. For the pooled 
sample, containing all officers in all communities, this model was estimated using 
IN@6YRS as the dependent variable. Independent variables were: VGEP, SCHOLAR, 
FEMALE, MINORITY, ATHLETE, GROUP2, GROUP3, NSWO, NSUB, SPEC, 
OCOMM, YR88, YR89, YR90, YR92, YR93, YR94, YR95, and YR96.1 
Thus, the logit model specification was as follows: 
IN@6YRS= α0 + ß0VGEP + ß1SCHOLAR + ß 2FEMALE + ß3MINORITY + 
ß4ATHLETE + ß5GROUP2 + ß6GROUP3 + ß7NSWO + ß8NSUB + ß9SPEC + 
ß10OCOMM + ß11YR88 + ß12YR89 + ß13YR90 + ß14YR92 + ß15YR93 +ß16YR94 + 
ß17YR95 + ß18YR96. 
To determine if results would be affected by an officer’s community affiliation, 
the community dummy variables were removed and the data sample was split into 
community groupings as explained above. A similar binary logit regression model was 
estimated that omitted the dummy variables for community: 
                                                 
1 SWO was specifically excluded making it the reference community. Likewise, 
1991, the first year not significantly affected by the post-Cold War drawdown, was 
excluded, making it the graduation year reference point. 
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IN@6YRS= α0 + ß0VGEP + ß1SCHOLAR + ß 2FEMALE2 + ß3MINORITY + 
ß4ATHLETE + ß5GROUP2 + ß6GROUP3 + ß11YR88 + ß12YR89 + ß13YR90 + ß14YR92 
+ ß15YR93 +ß16YR94 + ß17YR95 + ß18YR96. 
For all logit models, the marginal effect of each independent variable was 
calculated. Results were judged to be statistically significant if they met the 95% 
confidence threshold using a one-tail test. 
E. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The costs of VGEP and Scholarship were determined. The resultant costs were 
compared to statistically determined retention behaviors for both program participants 
and the comparison group. The economic model was recreated from Bowman (2000). 
F. PROGRAM COSTS TO THE GOVERNMENT 
To determine the cost of the VGEP and Scholarship programs, ensign (O-1 <2yrs 
service) Base Pay was added to ensign housing and subsistence allowances (BAH and 
BAS) for the Annapolis, MD area (Zip Code 21402). Since VGEP students are still 
attached to USNA, this was the correct cost measure. However, Scholarship students 
often left Annapolis to attend graduate school and drew allowances based on their actual 
geographical location. Annapolis is a relatively high cost area to live and Annapolis BAH 
values are higher than in many other areas. By retaining the higher Annapolis BAH 
values in the Scholarship cost analysis, a conservative measure of costs was obtained and 
the need to determine the actual allowances for program recipients, which would vary 
widely from year to year as students accepted scholarships from institutions in different 
locations, was eliminated. Scholarship recipients incurred no government funded 
education costs. VGEP recipients were each limited to $10,000 in government funding. 
Even though it is possible that many students did not use the full $10,000 government 
VGEP subsidy, the full subsidy amount was used for each student to obtain bias the cost-
benefit analysis against graduate education. 
                                                 
2 FEMALE was eliminated from the submarine community analysis since women 
are restricted from submarine duty. 
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All base pays and allowances were calculated for participants during the 
remaining time up to the six-year window. These were added to the direct costs of by the 
graduate education. 
Non-participant officer costs were calculated in a similar manner. Ensign, 
lieutenant (junior grade), and lieutenant base pay and allowances were calculated up to 
the six-year point to determine the cost of a six-year non-participant officer. It should be 
noted that many officers receive bonuses, specialty or proficiency pays, but these were 
deliberately omitted to derive a conservative cost estimate. 
By definition, non-participant officer costs do not include the cost of graduate 
school. Officers returning from fleet service rarely receive full scholarships to graduate 
school and depend on some sort of government funding to complete a Master's degree. 
This can come in the form of tuition assistance (TA), graduate education voucher (GEV), 
or a fully-funded program such as Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The Navy’s GEV 
allows up to $40,000 for completion of a Master's degree while USNA’s LEAD program 
costs around $20,000 per student. NPS resident education costs can exceed $160,000 
depending on program of study (Gates, Maruyama, Powers, Rosenthal, & Cooper, 1998, 
p. 14). None of the above cost figures includes the officers’ pay and allowances. The 
costs to provide non-participants with a Master's degree, as well as any possible 
performance differences from lack of early graduate education, were specifically ignored 
during this study. 
G. CUMULATIVE COSTS AT SIX YEARS OF SERVICE 
Using the above costs, the total cost to the government will be estimated for an 
officer reaching six years of active duty in both programs as well as for a six-year 
lieutenant who has not received graduate education at government expense. Pay and 
allowances will be included for all officers from commissioning until the six-year point. 
Retention ratios for communities and/or programs, where statistical significance is 
achieved, will be combined with the associated costs at the six-year point to achieve an 
estimate of the total cost of each officer. The number of commissioned USNA ensigns 
required to achieve 1 six-year lieutenant will be determined for each program and/or 
 25
community. Estimated costs required to achieve 1 six-year lieutenant for early graduate 
education participants will be compared against the same costs for non-participants. 
H. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The following definitions are offered to support research and clarify results: 
Program participants is defined as those USNA graduates from 1988-1996 who 
participated in either VGEP or civilian Scholarship programs. Delayed graduate 
education opportunities such as the Burke Scholarship were not examined. 
Retention: Program participants who remain on active military service until at 
least the six-year point after USNA graduation are defined as stayers. Due to varying 
USNA graduation dates, the retention date was set for all years at 1 June, six years after 
USNA graduation. 
Peers: The comparison group for program participants. Retention outcomes will 
be compared for each group.  
Order Of Merit (OOM): OOM is a measure used at USNA to rank graduates. It 
encompasses academic and military performance grades as well as conduct, physical 
education and athletic achievement (USNA, 1996a).  
Voluntary Graduate Education Program (VGEP): VGEP is a USNA-only program 
where highly qualified First Class Midshipmen attend graduate school starting their last 
semester at USNA. After USNA graduation, they remain assigned to USNA and are 
expected to complete a Master's degree by December of the same year (USNA, 2001). 
Extensions are occasionally granted allowing the student until the following May to 
complete graduate studies. Costs to the government include up to $10,000 in tuition and 
fees as well as pay and benefits. 
Scholarship Program: The scholarship program is a Navy-wide program that 
allows graduating Midshipmen and NROTC candidates to accept civilian scholarships to 
graduate school. For those who are offered scholarships, and for whom the Navy allows 
their acceptance, the Navy allows the officer up to two years to complete a graduate 
degree. The only direct cost to the government is pay and benefits while the student 
attends graduate school. Education costs are covered by the scholarship and/or the 
student (CNO, 1998). USNA gets the vast majority of the Navy’s authorized billets. 
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Minimum Service Requirement (MSR): Depending on community of service 
assigned, USNA graduates are obligated to at least five years of active duty. All members 
in the sample pool were obligated to a five year MSR. 
I. HYPOTHESES 
For this study several hypotheses will be tested. Based on the increased 
marketability of officers with graduate degrees, it is assumed that there will be some sort 
of loss associated with offering graduate education programs. The null hypothesis would 
be that program participants leave the Navy at the same rate as non-participants. The 
alternate hypothesis would be that program participants stay in service at a different rate 
than their peers. 
H0 = Graduate education recipients do not attrite at a differing level than their 
peers. 
HA = Graduate education recipients exit the Navy at a different rate than their 
peers. 
J. ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to conduct this study, several assumptions had to be made.  USNA 
graduation Order Of Merit (OOM) is more than a class rank. It is assumed to be a 
demonstration of personality, motivation, work ethic, emotional and intellectual 
intelligence. The actual mathematical calculation to determine OOM changes over time 
but it is assumed that those who graduate near the top of the class are systematically 
different from those near the bottom. Regardless of the formula, OOM is assumed to be a 
reliable measure of relative quality of USNA graduates. Thus, the USNA graduate who is 
15th in the graduating class is not an academic or educational peer of the 915th graduate. 
It is assumed that the logit model includes all reasonable variables that affect 
officer retention and that the effect of VGEP or Scholarship selection can be reliably 




It is assumed that USNA graduates with low OOM (near the top of their class) 
will have better civilian employment opportunities than their classmates at the bottom of 
the class. Therefore, graduates with low OOM will constitute a superior comparison 
























IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the retention analysis. Demographic factors 
were included in the regression model to determine if any of these demographic factors 
affected a member’s retention decision. Table 2 provides frequencies of background 
characteristics of USNA graduating classes by sex for the 1988-1996 period. Table 3 
displays frequencies of program participants and the total number of USNA graduates by 
year. 
Table 2 Frequencies of USNA Graduates by GENDER. 
 Males Females Total 
Graduates 8144 860 9004 
Program Participants 299 13 312 
Group 1 Major 3177 188 3365 
Group 2 Major 2267 301 2568 
Group 3 Major 2694 371 3065 
Unknown Major 6 0 6 
Non-Caucasian 1316 158 1474 
Varsity Athletes 2172 460 2632 
 
Table 3 Program Participants by YEAR. 
YEAR VGEP Scholarship USNA Grads 
1988 10 8 1060 
1989 10 14 1082 
1990 9 10 1008 
1991 7 8 955 
1992 6 18 1031 
1993 5 19 1066 
1994 8 18 940 
1995 12 18 916 
1996 5 20 946 
Total 72 133 9004 
 
A. THE COMPARISON GROUP 
Table 4 shows the distribution of program participants by OOM. Descriptives for 
program participants in Table 5 show that the overwhelming majority of selectees were 
ranked in the top 200 OOM. Fully 65 of 72 VGEP participants (90.3%) and 127 of 133 
Scholarship participants (95.5%) were ranked in the top 200 OOM. The overall 
percentage of participants ranked in the top 200 OOM was 93.7%. Thus, all USNA 
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graduates who ranked in the top 200 OOM were identified as the comparison group for 
the program participants. Program participants’ retention at the six-year point will be 
compared to graduates ranked on the OOM ≤200. The total number of officers meeting 
this condition was 1012, including the 65 VGEP and 127 Scholarship recipients. 
Frequencies of demographic characteristics of the program participants are shown in 
Table 5 and of the comparison group in Table 6. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of Program Participants by OOM. 
     USNA Ranking      VGEP #  
(cumulative %) 
Scholarship  
# (cumulative %) 
Total Recipients 
# (cumulative %) 
           Top 100 OOM     50 (69.4%) 115 (86.5%) 165 (80.5%) 
Top 200 OOM     65 (90.3%) 127 (96.2%) 192 (93.7%) 
Top 300 OOM     70 (97.2%) 130 (97.7%) 200 (97.6%) 
Top 400 OOM     71 (98.6%) 131 (98.5%) 202 (98.5%) 
Total 72 133 205 
Table 5 Frequencies of Characteristics of Program Participants. 
Descriptor VGEP (N=72) Scholarship (N=133) Total (N=205) 
Males 68 125 193 
Females 4 8 12 
Non-Caucasian 4 15 19 
Varsity Athlete 16 41 57 
Group 1 Major 19 93 112 
Group 2 Major 20 26 46 
Group 3 Major 33 14 47 
SWO 15 15 30 
Nuclear SWO 8 12 20 
Nuclear SUB 39 92 131 
SEAL/Spec Ops 3 6 9 
        Other Community 6 8 15 
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Table 6 Frequencies of Characteristics of Comparison Group. 




Varsity Athlete 282 
Group 1 Major 378 
Group 2 Major 259 
Group 3 Major 171 
SWO 165 
Nuclear SWO 72 
Nuclear SUB 329 
SEAL/Spec Ops 76 
Other Community 166 
 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Statistics from the regression models are presented in this chapter under the 
appropriate section heading. The complete results of the individual logit models are 
contained in APPENDIX A. Of the 1013 officers analyzed, 670 remained on active duty 
six years after USNA graduation, a retention rate of 66.14%. The retention experience for 
program participants was 54 stayers of 65 VGEP participants, and 109 stayers of 127 
Scholarship participants, for retention rates of 83.08% and 85.83%, respectively. 
Retention rates are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 Sample Retention Rates 
Group Stayers Retention Rate 
Comparison Group 507 of 808 62.75% 
VGEP 54 of 65 83.08% 
Scholarship 109 of 127 85.83% 
Pooled Sample 670 of 1013 66.14% 
 
C. REGRESSION RESULTS: POOLED SAMPLE 
Table 8 displays the results of the retention model for the pooled sample, 
containing all 1013 officers in all communities. The table presents the mean value of each 
independent variable and the estimated coefficients and associated significance levels. 
Finally, the last column displays the calculated marginal effects of each variable. 
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Table 8 Pooled Sample Retention Model. 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.06 1.203 0.001 0.262 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.13 1.195 0.000 0.261 
Demographics: 
FEMALE 0.11 0.261 0.301 0.057 
MINORITY 0.07 0.344 0.233 0.075 
ATHLETE 0.26 0.012 0.945 0.003 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.300 -0.220 0.193 -0.048 
GROUP3 0.220 -0.251 0.194 -0.055 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB 0.45 0.150 0.469 0.033 
NSWO 0.09 -0.816 0.003 -0.178 
SPEC 0.08 0.150 0.608 0.033 
OCOMM 0.18 -0.435 0.064 -0.095 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.1115 -0.651 0.034 -0.142 
YR89 0.1451 -0.811 0.005 -0.177 
YR90 0.1254 -0.639 0.032 -0.139 
YR92 0.1007 -0.195 0.547 -0.042 
YR93 0.1046 -0.806 0.010 -0.176 
YR94 0.1066 -0.759 0.015 -0.165 
YR95 0.1115 -0.342 0.276 -0.074 
YR96 0.0898 0.090 0.800 0.020 
Constant 1 1.144 0.000 0.249 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 or .10 level) in bold 
For the pooled sample, compared to conventional SWOs, nuclear SWOs were 
17.8% less likely to stay in the Navy for six years. Members of the Classes of 1988, 
1989, 1990, 1993, and 1994 were more likely to leave the service before six years than 
the reference class (1991). 
Both graduate education program logit coefficients were positive and significant 
in Table 8. The marginal effect indicates that VGEP participants were 26.2% more likely 
to remain in service, and that Scholarship participants were 26.1% more likely to remain 
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in service to the six year point. Program participation has an important, positive effect on 
officer retention. 
D. REGRESSION RESULTS: SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS (NON-
NUCLEAR) 
Of the 195 Surface Warfare Officers analyzed, 63 remained on active service six 
years after USNA graduation, including 13 of 14 VGEP and 12 of 15 Scholarship 
recipients. The initial model failed to converge due to the small sample of minorities. 
Thus, the MINORITY variable was eliminated and the model re-estimated. Table 9 
shows the results of the SWO retention model. 
Table 9 Surface Warfare Retention Model 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.0718 1.991 .000 0.408 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0769 0.698 0.323 0.143 
Demographics: 
FEMALE 0.0564 -0.313 0.529 -0.064 
MINORITY N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ATHLETE 0.28 -0.219 0.566 -0.045 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.270 -0.088 0.841 -0.018 
GROUP3 0.430 -0.154 0.709 -0.032 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.0564 -0.795 0.411 -0.163 
YR89 0.17 -1.964 0.007 -0.402 
YR90 0.0769 -1.485 0.071 -0.304 
YR92 0.12 -0.799 0.319 -0.164 
YR93 0.0769 -1.642 0.047 -0.336 
YR94 0.1 -0.504 0.553 -0.103 
YR95 0.12 -0.189 0.822 -0.039 
YR96 0.17 -0.765 0.314 -0.157 
Constant 1 1.798 0.008 0.368 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 or .10 level) in bold 
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For the conventional Surface Warfare Officers, the Classes of 1989 and 1993 
were less likely (40.2 and 33.6%, respectively) to stay in the Navy for six years than the 
reference class (1991). The VGEP program logit is positive and significant. SWO VGEP 
participants are 40.8% more likely than SWO non-participants to remain in service until 
the six year point. The coefficient of the Scholarship program was not significant 
indicating there is no difference between Scholarship participants’ retention and non-
participants’ retention. 
E. REGRESSION RESULTS: SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 
(NUCLEAR) 
Of the 92 Surface Warfare Officers (Nuclear) analyzed, 47 remained on active 
service six years after USNA graduation, including five of seven VGEP and nine of 11 
Scholarship recipients. The originally proposed model failed to converge so the 
MINORITY and YR96 variables were eliminated and the regression rerun. Table 10 
shows the results of the Surface Warfare (Nuclear) model estimation. 
Table 10 Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear) Retention  Model 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.0761 1.037 0.322 0.258 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.12 1.845 0.050 0.459 
Demographics: 
FEMALE 0.087 0.199 0.845 0.050 
MINORITY N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ATHLETE 0.21 -0.158 0.833 -0.039 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.230 1.430 0.036 0.356 
GROUP3 0.210 -0.117 0.855 -0.029 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear) Retention  Model (Continued) 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.18 -1.938 0.178 -0.482 
YR89 0 N/A N/A 0.000 
YR90 0.1254 -1.261 0.545 -0.314 
YR92 0.13 -0.760 0.766 -0.189 
YR93 0.0978 -1.992 0.366 -0.495 
YR94 0.0978 -1.344 0.953 -0.334 
YR95 0.13 0.415 0.208 0.103 
YR96 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Constant 1 0.436 0.431 0.108 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 level) in bold 
 
Within the Surface Warfare Officers (Nuclear), Group 2 majors were 35.6% more 
likely than Group 1 majors to remain on active duty for six years. The Scholarship 
coefficient was both positive and statistically significant. NSWOs participating in the 
Scholarship program were 45.9% more likely than NSWO non-participants to remain on 
active duty until the six-year point. The coefficient of VGEP was not significant, 
indicating there is no difference in retention between VGEP participants and non-
participants. 
F. REGRESSION RESULT: SUBMARINE WARFARE OFFICERS 
(NUCLEAR) 
Of the 460 Submarine Warfare Officers (Nuclear) analyzed, 330 remained on 
active service six years after USNA graduation, including 32 of 35 VGEP and 79 of 87 
Scholarship recipients. Table 11 depicts the results of the Submarine Warfare (Nuclear) 
model estimation. 
Table 11 Submarine Warfare Officer (Nuclear) Retention Model 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.0761 1.863 0.003 0.346 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.19 1.647 0.000 0.306 
Demographics: 
FEMALE N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MINORITY 0.0804 -0.679 0.077* -0.126 
ATHLETE 0.22 0.030 0.915 0.006 
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Table 11 Submarine Warfare Officer (Nuclear) Retention Model (Continued) 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.260 -0.408 0.113 -0.076 
GROUP3 0.120 -0.130 0.721 -0.024 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.13 -0.744 0.135 -0.138 
YR89 0.17 -1.007 0.032 -0.187 
YR90 0.16 -0.604 0.213 -0.112 
YR92 0.0807 0.139 0.816 0.026 
YR93 0.1 -0.853 0.105 -0.158 
YR94 0.11 -0.997 0.053* -0.185 
YR95 0.0913 -0.622 0.262 -0.116 
YR96 0.0587 0.254 0.735 0.047 
Constant 1 1.423 0.001 0.264 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 or .10 level) in bold 
The variable FEMALE was removed from the Submarine Warfare Officer 
(Nuclear) analysis because submarine duty is restricted to men only. The members of the 
Class of 1989 were more likely to leave the service by six years than the reference class 
(1991). The coefficient of Minority status and Class of 1994 were marginally significant 
and negative. 
The coefficients for both the VGEP and Scholarship programs were positive and 
significant. VGEP participants were 34.6% more likely than non-participants to remain in 
service until 6 years and Scholarship participants were over 30% more likely to remain in 
service than non-participants. The effects of early graduate education on retention were 
strongest in the submarine community. 
G. REGRESSION RESULTS: SPECWAR/SPECOPS OFFICERS 
Of the 85 SEAL and Special Operations Officers analyzed, 59 remained on active 
service six years after USNA graduation, including two of three VGEP and four of six 
Scholarship recipients. The originally proposed model failed to converge so the 
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MINORITY, FEMALE and YR93 variables were eliminated and the logit model re-
estimated. Table 12 shows the results of the SpecWar/SpecOps model estimation. 
Table 12 Special Warfare Retention Model 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.0353 -1.093 0.518 -0.218 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0706 -0.597 0.550 -0.119 
Demographics: 
FEMALE N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MINORITY N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ATHLETE 0.34 0.463 0.438 0.092 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.190 -0.666 0.342 -0.133 
GROUP3 0.290 -0.245 0.690 -0.049 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.0941 -1.956 0.067 -0.390 
YR89 0.0941 -1.973 0.061 -0.394 
YR90 0.0941 -1.593 0.139 -0.318 
YR92 0.12 -1.531 0.133 -0.305 
YR93 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
YR94 0.15 -1.686 0.086 -0.336 
YR95 0.15 -0.983 0.342 -0.196 
YR96 0.11 0.162 0.909 0.032 
Constant 1 2.175 0.011 0.434 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 level) in bold 
There were no statistically significant variables in the retention model for the 
SpecWar/SpecOps group. Early graduate education recipients’ retention is not 
statistically different from their peers, but it should be kept in mind that the model was 
estimated using only 85 observations, so that the results may not be reliable. 
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H. ALL OTHER COMMUNITIES 
Of 181 officers in various, often unrelated, communities grouped into the 
“OCOMM” variable, 102 remained on active duty six years after USNA graduation. Two 
of six VGEP and five of eight Scholarship recipients remained on active duty at six years. 
Table 13 shows the results of the Other Communities model estimation. 
 
Table 13 Other Officer Community Retention Model 
VARIABLE MEAN Coefficient SIG MARGINAL
Grad Ed: EFFECT 
VGEP 0.0331 -1.097 0.254 -0.267 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0442 0.100 0.905 0.024 
Demographics: 
FEMALE 0.036 -0.080 0.835 -0.019 
MINORITY 0.0829 0.600 0.349 0.146 
ATHLETE 0.33 0.347 0.348 0.085 
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 0.520 -0.425 0.296 -0.104 
GROUP3 0.210 -0.562 0.259 -0.137 
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 0.1 0.634 0.378 0.154 
YR89 0.14 0.533 0.421 0.130 
YR90 0.11 -0.470 0.478 -0.115 
YR92 0.11 -0.236 0.724 -0.058 
YR93 0.15 -0.949 0.125 -0.231 
YR94 0.0718 -0.679 0.379 -0.165 
YR95 0.1 -1.213 0.083 -0.296 
YR96 0.0829 0.006 0.994 0.001 
Constant 1 0.782 0.174 0.191 
Note: statistically significant coefficients (at .05 level) in bold 
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There were no statistically significant results in the retention model for the Other 
Community group. Early graduate education participants in all “other communities” were 
not statistically different from non-participants in retention behavior. However, again, the 
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V. COST ANALYSIS 
A cost-benefits analysis is presented in this chapter to determine the average per-
officer cost to the government for each program, as well as the overall costs for all 
participants. Program participants’ cost-to-the-government will be compared to estimated 
costs for non-participating officers reaching the same 6 year point. Comparisons of these 
estimated costs will be used to determine the programs’ cost efficiencies. 
Junior Naval officers follow a fairly rigid promotion pattern until the lieutenant 
commander (LCDR/O-4) selection, which occurs around 10 years service. Normal 
promotion windows were used to calculate officer costs. Officers stay in the rank of 
ensign (ENS) and lieutenant (junior grade) (LTJG) for two years each. At the four-year 
point, they are promoted to lieutenant (LT) where they remain until their LCDR screen. 
Table 14 explains the pay and allowances used to determine the cost of an officer. 
Table 14 Officer Cost Elements* 
ENS<2yrs Base Pay:  $2183.70 
ENS BAH (w/o dep):  $995.00 
BAS (for all officers):  $167.20 
ENS Education Cost:  $10,000 (VGEP only) 
LTJG>2yrs Base Pay:  $2864.70 
LTJG>3yrs Base Pay:  $3299.40 
LTJG avg Base Pay:  $3082.05 (averaged over the 2 years as a LTJG) 
LTJG BAH (w/o dep): $1229.00 
LT>4yrs Base Pay:  $3883.50 
LT BAH (w/ dep):  $1781.00 
Officer bonuses/pro-pays: Not included 
             
*All figures monthly except ENS Education Cost which is a one-time payment. 
Source: DFAS/DTIC 
Certain non-cash military benefits such as commissary, exchange and leisure 
privileges were ignored since the value of the benefits would have been similar for all 
service members. Although, the married lieutenant’s family health care coverage may be 
worth more than a single ensign’s coverage, this factor also was ignored. 
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A. NET COST PER VGEP OFFICER AT SIX YEARS 
To determine overall VGEP cost to the government, base pay and allowances 
were added to education costs. Only pay after USNA graduation was included since the 
participant would have been receiving midshipman pay regardless of program 
participation and would not have seen fleet service during this time. Total base pay and 
allowances were calculated for this officer until the six-year point. The sum of education 
costs and pay and allowances was used as the government’s cost to produce a six-year 
lieutenant via the VGEP program. Since an officer is normally promoted to LTJG at the 
two-year point and remains until the four-year point at which time he/she is promoted to 
LT, the LTJG>2yrs service and LTJG>3yrs service base pay rates have been averaged to 
produce the LTJG avg Base Pay which is used in the cost calculations. Table 15 shows 
the cost breakdown of the VGEP program. 
Table 15 VGEP Participant Cost Breakdown 
ENS Base Pay    $2,183.70 
+  ENS BAH (w/o dep)      $995.00 
+ ENS BAS       $167.20 
= Cost per month   $3,345.90 
X number of months      6 
= Total Pay & Allowances $20,075.40 
+ Gov’t Education Cost  $10,000.00 
= Net Program Cost   $30,075.40 
 
 ENS Pay & Allowances    $3345.90 
X number of ENS months remaining   18 
= Remaining ENS Cost  $60,226.20 
+ Net Program Cost  $30,075.40 
= Total ENS Cost  $90,301.60  
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 LTJG avg Base Pay   $3,082.05 
+  LTJG BAH (w/o dep)    $1229.00 
+ LTJG BAS       $167.20 
= Cost per month   $4,478.25 
X number of months    24 
= Total Pay & Allowances      $107,478.00 
= Total LTJG Cost          $107,478.00 
 
 LT Base Pay      $3883.50 
+  LT BAH (w/ dep)     $1,781.00 
+ LT BAS        $167.20 
= Cost per month    $5,831.70 
X number of months      24 
= Total LT Cost           $139,960.80 
 
The government costs associated with each rank are added to estimate the total 
government cost of an officer over six years: 
$90,301.60 + $107,478.00 + $139,960.80 = $337,740.40 per VGEP officer 
B. NET COST PER SCHOLARSHIP OFFICER AT SIX YEARS 
To determine the cost of the Scholarship program, a similar model was used. 
There were no direct education costs to the government since the scholarship and student 
cover all education costs. Table 16 shows a government cost breakdown of the 
Scholarship program. Participants normally remain in the Scholarship program for a full 
24 months, the same duration as their time in the rank of ensign. Thus, the Scholarship 
coats and ENS coats are the same. 
 
Table 16 Scholarship Cost Breakdown. 
 ENS Base Pay     $2,183.70 
+  ENS BAH (w/o dep)       $995.00 
+ ENS BAS        $167.20 
= Cost per month    $3,345.90 
X number of months      24 
= Total Pay & Allowances $80,301.60 
+ Gov’t Education Cost           $0.00 
= ENS/Net Program Cost $80,301.60 
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 LTJG avg Base Pay   $3,082.05 
+  LTJG BAH (w/o dep)    $1229.00 
+ LTJG BAS       $167.20 
= Cost per month   $4,478.25 
X number of months    24 
= Total Pay & Allowances      $107,478.00 
= Total LTJG Cost          $107,478.00 
 
 LT Base Pay      $3883.50 
+  LT BAH (w/ dep)     $1,781.00 
+ LT BAS        $167.20 
= Cost per month    $5,831.70 
X number of months      24 
= Total LT Cost           $139,960.80 
             
The government costs associated with each rank are added to estimate the total 
government cost of this officer over six years: 
$80,301.60 + $107,478.00 + $139,960.80 = $327,740.40 per Scholarship officer 
C. NET COST PER NON-PARTICIPANT OFFICER AT SIX YEARS 
To determine non-participating officer costs, the same model was used. The 
values were the same as the Scholarship program since the government absorbs no 
education costs in either case. It should be noted that though the net financial costs are 
the same at the six-year point, non-participants did not have the additional human capital 
investment in the form of graduate education while serving in their initial fleet tours. 
Their additional fleet experience (since they did not attend graduate school and instead 
entered fleet service directly) will likely be offset by significantly higher graduate 
education costs for those who choose to stay and complete a Master’s degree at 
government expense. 
D. COST DISCUSSION 
For the sake of simplicity, additional pays such as sea pay, submarine pay, and 
hazardous duty pays were ignored. The additional pays were deemed insignificant to the 
overall point of the analysis. The only possible exception noted would be submarine pay, 
which for a LT>4yrs is $510 per month. This compensation, like all other special pays, 
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would make the cost of a six-year submariner higher, thus amplifying the relative cost-
savings associated with higher retention for this group. 
E. NET PROGRAM COSTS PER OFFICER 
Using the previously determined retention statistics and the costs per program, an 
analysis of costs and benefits was conducted. As previously noted, all costs to the 
government have been set at relatively conservative values and certain forms of 
compensation have been ignored for simplicity. Had these forms of compensation been 
included, they would have increased the overall cost of nurturing an officer to the six-
year point. This would have amplified any cost savings found and would have further 
demonstrated the cost efficiency of retaining officers as compared to recruiting and 
training new accessions. 
The cost comparisons shown will emphasize post-commissioning time and 
associated direct costs. Since the entire sample is made up of USNA graduates, any 
benefits due to differences in retention would be significantly amplified if USNA costs 
were included. With a cost of $275,001 per graduate (USNA 2003) (cost estimates vary 
yearly based on budgets and the number of midshipmen in the brigade), the cost savings 
associated with higher retention would be very high. Furthermore, cost estimates do not 
include such costs as Naval Nuclear Power School, Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS), and Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S). Adding these training costs 
in would add millions of dollars to the cost of officers reaching the six-year point. By 
retaining instead of recruiting and retraining, many of these initial training costs would be 
avoided, saving the government untold millions of dollars. 
Cost benefit analysis can only be reliably conducted when the retention effects of 
the graduate education programs (in Chapter IV) were statistically significant. 
Coefficients failing to reach the statistical significance threshold of 95% were not 
considered reliable, therefore program retention rates are assumed not to vary 
significantly from non-participant rates. Accordingly, cost comparisons for non-
significant programs have been conducted using non-participant predicted retention rates. 
Cost comparisons were conducted by determining the statistical retention 
likelihood for program participants and/or non-participants, as appropriate. This was 
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expressed as a percentage of cases where the officer could be reliably (95%) expected to 
remain in service to the six-year point. In order to compare different scenarios (VGEP, 
Scholarship, or non-participant) the equations were set up to determine the cost to 
produce one officer remaining in service to the six-year point. This involved inverting the 
retention percentage to estimate the number of officers needed to achieve a single officer 
at six years: 
1/Retention Rate = number of officers required to produce 1 six-year officer 
The estimated cost was determined by multiplying the number of officers required 
to produce one officer at six years by the cost per officer. The values calculated were 
estimates, therefore all calculated values were rounded to whole dollars: 
# of Required Officers X Cost per Officer = Net Program Cost 
F. ADJUSTED PROGRAM COSTS PER OFFICER 
If officers are attending graduate school instead of proceeding to the fleet, 
additional officers must be found to fill the vacant billets in order to maintain fleet 
manning levels. To objectively evaluate the cost of the programs, it is necessary to 
determine the cost of the additional officers required to fill billets which would otherwise 
be left unfilled by officers in an early graduate education program. This calculation takes 
the inverse of the actual fleet time divided by the total time spent in the program and fleet 
together (which, in this thesis, is the six-year point). By determining the inverse of the 
actual productive fleet time, the costs can be determined by multiplying this result by the 
cost per participant for the respective program. Since the costs are broken down by 
community, and all officers within a given community attend the same schools and 
complete the same training pipelines, regardless of program affiliation, any time spent 
outside an early graduate education program is considered to be useful time spent within 
the community. Thus, only the time spent within an early graduate education program 
will be counted as “opportunity cost” or time spent outside what would normally be 
expected of an officer within that community. Thus, the equation is as follows: 
1/(fleet time/6 years) X Net Program Cost = Adjusted Total Program Cost 
For the six-month (0.5 years) VGEP program the Adjusted Total Program Cost is: 
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1/(5.5 years/6 years) X $337,740.40 = $368,444 per VGEP participant 
Using the same equation for the Scholarship program, the Adjusted Total Program 
Cost would be:  
1/(4 years/6 years) X $327,740.40 = $491,611 per Scholarship participant 
Using the above information, it can be stated that VGEP participants incur an 
estimated $30,704 in opportunity costs while Scholarship participants incur an estimated 
$163,871 in additional costs per participant.  
Since non-participants did not assume any opportunity cost for early graduate 
education and spent the entire 6 years performing duties within their communities, non-
participant costs remained at $327,740 per non-participant.  
G. POOLED SAMPLE 
In the Pooled Sample retention model both VGEP and Scholarship participants 
statistically significant. For all 1013 officers, including the 65 VGEP and 127 Scholarship 
recipients, the probability of retaining to the six-year point was a 67.90%. 
When marginal effects were run for VGEP participants only, the predicted result 
was 84.87%. Thus, 1.18 VGEP officers must be accessed and trained to produce one 
officer at the six-year point (1/84.87 = 1.18) 
When 1.18 officers is multiplied by the adjusted cost of a VGEP participant, the 
Total Cost per six-year VGEP Officer is determined for the Pooled Sample: 
1.18 Officers X $368,444 = $434,764 Total Cost per six-year VGEP Officer 
The marginal effects for Scholarship recipients produced a statistical retention 
likelihood of 84.78%. Thus, 1.18 Scholarship officers must be accessed and trained to 
produce one six-year officer (1/84.87 = 1.18). 
1.18 officers are multiplied by the adjusted Scholarship cost, resulting in the Total 
Cost per six-year Scholarship Officer for the Pooled Sample: 
1.18 Officers X $491,611 = $580,101 Total Cost per six-year Scholarship 
Officer 
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The marginal retention effect of non-participants was 62.75%. Thus, 1.59 non-
participants must be accessed and trained to produce one non-participant at six years of 
service. 
1/62.75% = 1.59 officers required to produce 1 six-year officer. 
When 1.59 officers is multiplied by the non-participant cost, the result is 
$521,107. 
1.59 Officers X $327,740 = $521,107 (Non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
Using the total-cost-per-officer, the VGEP and Scholarship programs can be 
compared with non-participants. These are displayed in Table 17. 
Table 17 Pooled Sample Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer Cost Savings 
VGEP (N=65) $434,764  $86,343  
Scholarship (N=127) $580,101  ($58,994)  
non-participant (N=821) $521,107  N/A 
In the full sample, the cost savings associated with early graduate education are 
modest. VGEP was discovered to have an estimated net benefit of $86,343 over a non-
participant, whereas Scholarship had an apparent net loss of $58,994 per participant. 
These calculations do not include millions of dollars in training costs and experience 
value lost when non-participants leave the Navy at a higher rate. Further, any 
performance improvements that are based on the human capital improvements from 
graduate study are ignored. Also, in order to be most competitive for advancement and 
billet screening boards, non-participants often must obtain a graduate degree (Jordan 
(1991), Talaga (1994), Fuchs (1996), Bowman & Mehay (1999 & 2002), and Phillips 
(2001). Since this is often accomplished at government expense, the cost of non-
participant officers who remain in service may rise sharply near the end of, or 
immediately after, the six year point. The cost savings calculated in this study do not 
account for those non-participants who later obtain a graduate degree. Again, the costs of 
sea pay, submarine pay and hazardous duty pay have been ignored in this study. These 
would further increase the cost difference associated with those who leave the Navy. 
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H. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 
For the 195 SWOs analyzed, the predicted retention rate was 71.24%. The actual 
overall retention rate was 32.31% (63 of 195). The predicted VGEP retention rate was 
93.71%. The predicted Scholarship retention rate was 80.35% though the program’s 
retention variable was insignificant. Non-participant’s predicted retention rate was 
67.05% whereas the sample retention rate was 22.89% (38 of 166). This disparity 
between predicted and sample retention cannot be explained. 
Calculations were made to estimate cost-savings in a similar manner to the 
“Pooled Communities” calculations. For VGEP participants it required 1.07 officer 
accessions to produce one six-year officer. 
1/93.71 = 1.07 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
When 1.07 is multiplied by the adjusted VGEP cost, the result is $394,235. 
1.07 X $368,444 = $394,235 (VGEP cost per six-year officer) 
For Scholarship participants the marginal retention value was not statistically 
significant, meaning there is no reliable retention difference between Scholarship and 
non-participants. Therefore, the non-participant predicted retention rate is used for cost 
analysis and 1.49 officers are required to produce one six-year officer at a cost of 
$732,500. 
1/67.05% = 1.49 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.49 X $491,611 = $732,500 (Scholarship cost per six-year officer)  
The same calculation was conducted for non-participants. Non-participants 
required 1.49 officers to produce one six-year officer at a cost of $488,333. 
1/67.05% = 1.49 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.49 X $327,740 = $488,333 (non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
Table 18 shows the cost savings for the Surface community. These values were 
calculated using statistically generated predicted retention rates. Had this calculation for 
non-participants been conducted using observed retention data, the costs per non-
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participant officer would have been significantly higher and Scholarship much lower, 
making Scholarship more cost-effective. 
Using predicted retention rates, VGEP posted a $94,098 cost savings per officer. 
Scholarship, whose retention rate was not statistically different from non-participants, 
was estimated to cost nearly a quarter-million dollars per officer more than non-
participating officers. This is largely due to the two-years worth of opportunity cost in the 
form of missed fleet time which added an estimated $163,871 per officer to the cost. 
Opportunity cost, combined with no positive retention effects, showed the Scholarship 
program to be an expensive investment. 
Table 18 SWO Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer  Cost Savings 
VGEP (N=14) $394,235  $94,098 
Scholarship (N=15) $732,500  ($244,167) 
non-participant (N=166) $488,333  N/A 
VGEP is a very cost-effective investment based on retention and associated costs 
for the Surface Warfare Community. Scholarship is not beneficial on a strictly cost basis. 
I. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS (NUCLEAR) 
For the 92 NSWOs analyzed, the predicted retention was 53.67%. The VGEP 
program did not meet the significance threshold but was predicted to have 70.76% 
retention. The Scholarship program was observed to be significant and positive with 
respect to retention at MSR+1. Predicted retention was 84.45% at the six-year point. 
Non-participants were much more likely to leave the service before six years; Predicted 
retention was 46.17%. 
Again, calculations were made to estimate cost-savings in a similar manner to the 
“Pooled Communities” calculations. For the limited sample of VGEP participants, the 
predicted retention was not significantly different than non-participants so non-
participant predicted retention had to be used. It was calculated that it would require 2.14 
officer accessions to produce one six-year officer at a cost of $788,470. 
1/46.17% = 2.14 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
2.14 X $368,444 = $788,470 (VGEP cost per six-year officer) 
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For Scholarship participants there was a reliable retention difference, therefore 
non-participant predicted retention was used. This calculation showed that 1.18 officers 
were required to achieve one six-year officer at a cost of $580,101. 
1/46.17 = 1.18 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.18 X $491,611 = $580,101 (Scholarship cost per six-year officer) 
The same calculation was conducted for non-participants. Non-participants 
required 2.14 accessions to produce one six-year officer at a cost of $701,364.
 1/46.17% = 2.14 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
2.14 X $327,740 = $701,364 (non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
Table 19 NSWO Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer Cost Savings 
VGEP (N=7) $788,470 ($87,106) 
Scholarship (N=11) $580,101 $121,263 
non-participant (N=74) $701,364  N/A 
Within the Nuclear SWO community, Scholarship actually enhanced retention 
and VGEP did not to hurt retention (VGEP was not statistically significant though 
predicted and observed retention rates far exceeded non-participants). The lack of 
statistical significance indicated there was no reliable difference between VGEP 
participants and non-participants in the NSWO community. This proves the null 
hypothesis, that VGEP recipients do not leave the service at a differing rate than non-
participants. 
VGEP was determined to cost an estimated $87,106 more per officer than an 
officer with no early graduate. This apparent loss is caused by a combination of direct 
education costs, opportunity costs associated with the VGEP program as well as 
opportunity cost in the form of missed fleet time. The estimated cost savings of the 
Scholarship program exceeded $120,000 per officer without taking any nuclear-related 
recruiting or training into account. Figures for estimating the cost of nuclear power 
training are unavailable but they would add many millions to the cost of producing 
officers within the community, thus making Scholarship even more cost-effective. 
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The indicated cost-loss of the VGEP program was caused by the government 
incurred costs of VGEP (again, opportunity costs and direct education costs). There is no 
way to determine if receiving VGEP prevented additional personnel losses and thus 
might have minimized further financial loss to the Navy within the NSWO community. 
Neither, the human capital theory of performance improvements inherent in an officer 
receiving graduate education, nor the costs of providing non-participant officers with that 
graduate education are included in these analysis. 
J. SUBMARINE WARFARE OFFICERS (NUCLEAR) 
For the 460 submariners analyzed, the predicted retention rate was 75.35%. Both 
VGEP and Scholarship were observed to significantly improve retention at the six year 
point. VGEP predicted retention was 92.59%. Scholarship retention was a similarly 
impressive 90.97%. For non-participants, the retention dropped dramatically. Predicted 
retention for non-participants was 65.99%. 
To maintain comparability between communities, calculations were again made to 
estimate cost-savings in a similar manner to the “Pooled Communities” calculations. For 
VGEP participants where there was a statistical difference in retention, 1.08 accessions 
were required to produce one six-year officer at a cost of $397,920. 
1/92.59% = 1.08 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.08 X $368,444 = $397,920 (VGEP Cost per six-year officer) 
Similarly, for Scholarship participants who were also significantly different than 
non-participants, 1.10 accessions were required to produce one six-year officer at a cost 
of $540,772. 
1/90.97% = 1.10 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.10 X $491,611 = $540,772 (Scholarship cost per six-year officer) 
The same calculation was conducted for non-participants. Non-participants 
required 1.52 officer accessions to produce one six-year officer at a cost of $498,165.  
1/65.99% = 1.52 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
1.52 X $327,740 = $498,165 (non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
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Table 20 Submariner Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer Cost Savings 
VGEP (N=35) $397,920  $100,245  
Scholarship (N=87) $540,772  ($42,607)  
non-participant (N=338) $498,165  N/A 
For the submarine community, VGEP cost-savings are estimated at $100,245 
while the Scholarship program is estimated to post an apparent cost-loss of $42,607. The 
VGEP cost savings are a result of significantly improved retention coupled with a 
relatively low cost-of-opportunity (only six-months missed fleet time). As with other 
communities, the Scholarship cost-loss is due to high opportunity costs in the form of two 
years missed fleet time which added an estimated $163,871 per officer to the program 
cost. Without accounting for missed fleet time, Scholarship would have posted an 
impressive cost-savings for the submarine community.  
All predicted retention values were closely met by observed retention in the 
submarine community. Having one of the longest training pipelines and the largest pay 
and bonus rate in the research population, NSUBs are very expensive to train and retain. 
 As with NSWOs, costs associated with nuclear training and submarine school are 
unavailable. Adding these additional training costs would likely add hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to the per officer costs shown. The fact that both programs have a 
significant, positive effect on retention cannot be overstated. With these extremely 
valuable officers, the retention ratios have even more fiscal impact. NSUB is the 
community where the overall impact of the programs is felt most. 
K. SPECIAL WARFARE/OPERATIONS OFFICERS 
For the 85 officers observed in the Special Warfare/Special Operations 
community predicted retention was 72.47%. Neither VGEP, nor Scholarship were 
significantly linked to retention at six years. VGEP predicted retention was 48.90%. 
Scholarship predicted retention was 61.10%. Non-participants were predicted to have a 
74.06% retention likelihood. 
Calculations were made to estimate cost-savings in a similar manner to the 
“Pooled Communities” calculations. For VGEP and Scholarship participants there was no 
statistically significant difference in VGEP and non-participant retention so the non-
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participant retention rate must be used for retention estimation. Thus, it takes participants 
and non-participants each 1.35 officer accessions to make one six-year officer.  
1/74.06% = 1.35 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
Though retention is assumed to be the same due to the lack of significance, the 
costs per officer vary due to the differences in the program. VGEP officers cost $497,399 
to make one six-year officer. 
1.35 X $368,444 = $497,399 (VGEP cost per six-year officer) 
Similarly, for Scholarship participants the cost per six-year officer was $663,675.
 1.35 X $491,611 = $663,675 (Scholarship cost per six-year officer) 
The same calculation was conducted for non-participants resulting in a $442,450 
cost per officer. 
1.35 X $327,740 = $442,450 (non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
Table 21 SpecWar/SpecOps Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer (est.) Savings vs. non-
participants (est.) 
VGEP (N=3) $497,399  ($54,949) 
Scholarship (N=6) $663,675  ($221,225)  
non-participant (N=76) $442,450  N/A 
Both programs were observed to be non-significant with respect to retention at six 
years, thus proving the null-hypothesis, that SpecWar/SpecOps officers do not leave the 
Navy at differing rates than non-participants. Though not significant with respect to 
retention, the cost ratios for both VGEP and Scholarship showed higher estimated costs 
than for non-participants due to direct education and opportunity costs incurred by the 
government. As with previous communities, the opportunity costs associated with 
Scholarship program in the form of missed fleet time were significant. The Scholarship 
had an estimated cost-loss of over $220,000 per participant, of which $163,871 can be 
attributed to opportunity cost. 
Though both programs appear to have higher costs-per-officer, the number of 
VGEP and Scholarship participants in the SpecWar/SpecOps community was extremely 
small (N=3 and 6, respectively)  making  any  single  officer’s  decision  to  stay or leave 
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much more important than would otherwise be felt. These cost-figures must be taken in 
context of the extremely limited sample and not be overstated simply by their overall size 
or value. 
Based on this limited sample, graduate education does not appear to be a cost-
effective investment for this community. However, a larger sample or longer research 
timeframe might be required to definitively state SPEC graduate education is not a wise 
investment. That determination is beyond the scope of this study. Clearly, SPEC graduate 
education was not as important as it was observed to be within the nuclear communities 
(NSWO and NSUB). 
L. OTHER COMMUNITIES 
For the 181 remaining officers grouped under the “Other Communities” variable, 
predicted retention was 58.73%. Neither VGEP, nor Scholarship, was observed to be 
significant in relation to retention at the six-year point. VGEP predicted retention was 
32.21% and Scholarship retention was predicted at 61.13%. Though both VGEP and 
Scholarship observed retention rates were very close to their respective predicted rates, 
due to the small number of participants in both programs, the reliability the predicted 
retention rates is questionable. Non-participant retention was predicted at 58.73%. 
Calculations were made to estimate cost-savings in a similar manner to the 
“Pooled Communities” calculations. For all officers there was no statistically significant 
difference in retention therefore the non-participant retention rate must be used to 
determine costs. For all officers, it was determined that these lumped communities would 
require 1.70 officer accessions to produce one six-year officer. 
1/58.73% = 1.70 officers required to make 1 six-year officer. 
As with the SPEC community, the costs varied based on program costs. For the 
VGEP program, 1.70 officers were projected to cost $626,355. 
1.70 X $368,444 = $626,355 (VGEP cost per six-year officer) 
Similarly, for Scholarship participants, the 1.70 officers were projected to cost 
$835,739. 
1.70 X $491,611 = $835,739 (Scholarship cost per six-year officer) 
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The same calculation was conducted for non-participants. Since there was no 
statistical difference in retention and the government absorbed no direct graduate 
education costs in the Scholarship program, the resulting cost per officer for non-
participants matched the Scholarship value of $557,159. 
1.70 X $327,740 = $557,159 (non-participant cost per six-year officer) 
Table 22 illustrates the relative cost savings of VGEP and Scholarship within the 
“Other Communities” grouping. 
Table 22 Other Communities Cost Savings. 
Program Cost per officer Cost Savings 
VGEP (N=6) $626,355  ($69,196) 
Scholarship (N=8) $835,739  ($278,580)  
non-participant (N=167) $557,159  N/A 
 
As with the SPEC community, the results for the OCOMM need to be taken in 
context. Though predicted and actual retention were similar, the small number of 
participant officers in both programs limited the applicability of any results to this sample 
alone. Also, this grouping was largely support officers who were not placed (based on 
community) into any other variable grouping. Except for the 75 officers lumped into 
“Medical”, there are few enough officers in any given community to analyze with any 
legitimate measure of reliability. Cost comparisons were completed in the interest of 
thoroughness and research though further applicability of the results would have to be 
validated by additional research using a larger sample or longer research time period. 
As with the Special Warfare/Special Operations community, Scholarship 
appeared to cost significantly more per officer. Again, this is caused by the heavy 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several binary logit regression models were estimated to determine if variables 
previously shown to affect officer retention were related to retention in this study. The 
resulting logits were further analyzed to determine the marginal effect of each 
independent variable on retention. Logit models were estimated for the entire sample of 
graduates as well as for five separate sub-groups. By breaking officers down into 
communities, the effect of community affiliation was eliminated and officers in similar 
career paths could be compared. 
A. POOLED SAMPLE 
When the overall sample of officers (having an OOM in the top 200) was 
analyzed, it was determined that NSWOs were 17.8% more likely to exit the Navy before 
the six-year point than the reference community (conventional SWO). This could 
possibly be due to the dot-com and technology-intensive hiring frenzy of the mid to late 
1990s. Engineers in many fields were making significant salaries to fuel the huge 
technology boom in the civilian sector, possibly drawing NSWOs out of the Navy. 
However, this hypothesis is contradicted by Group1 majors (engineers) who were no 
more likely to leave than other majors. 
For the pooled sample, both VGEP and Scholarship recipients are about 26% 
more likely to remain in service at the six-year point than non-participants. This is a 
direct refutation of the major research hypothesis, namely that program participants 
would be more likely to leave the Navy. This finding does support a major theme found 
during the literature review: graduate education tends to improve retention. For the 
Pooled Sample it could be said, using logic previously presented, that the Navy is gaining 
a return on its investment in graduate education through the VGEP and Scholarship 
programs.  Program participation has an important positive effect on officer retention. 
Regarding the cost effectiveness of the programs, VGEP is estimated to save the 
government over $86,000 per participant while Scholarship is estimated to cost nearly 
$59,000 per officer more than a non-participant. With the sheer amount of money 
involved in growing officers, and the cost of lost experience when officers leave the 
Navy, it is the contention of the author that the additional cost of 12% per officer may be 
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largely offset by other benefits such as human capital improvements and retained 
experience for those who receive graduate education through the Scholarship program. 
VGEP is assessed to be cost-effective while Scholarship is assessed to be only marginally 
cost-effective, on average, for all officer communities. The sections below summarize the 
results for each separate officer community. 
B. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 
Participation in VGEP was observed to have a positive impact on retention of 
SWOs at the six-year point. This is a direct refutation of the research hypothesis that 
highly educated officers would be more likely to be drawn out of the Navy during the 
booming civilian economy of the mid to late 1990s. Remembering that VGEP 
participants are largely non-technical majors, it is possible VGEP graduates were not 
drawn into the civilian sector since they would not fit the ideal mold for a technical 
position with a civilian employer. Even accounting for opportunity costs necessary to 
maintain fleet manning levels at current levels, VGEP posted a cost-savings of over 
$94,000, making it a solid investment for the SWO community. 
The Scholarship program did not have a statistically significant retention effect. 
The large opportunity costs combined with no differences in retention (compared to the 
comparison group) caused Scholarship to post an estimated loss of nearly a quarter-
million dollars. Scholarship does not appear to be a good investment for the SWO 
community. 
C. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS (NUCLEAR) 
The propensity for NSWOs to leave was observed in the pooled sample. Within 
the Surface Warfare Officer (Nuclear) sample, it was observed that Group 2 majors were 
35.6% more likely than the reference major (Group 1) to remain on active duty until at 
least six years. Again, this could be explained by the active civilian technical job market 
throughout the mid-1990s. Engineers may have been drawn out of the NSWO community 
into better paying civilian jobs. 
NSWO Scholarship participants experienced a statistically significant 45.9% 
retention premium at the six-year point. This retention advantage for graduate education 
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recipients again supports the major theme found in the literature. With an estimated cost-
savings of over $120,000 per officer, Scholarship is clearly effective for this community. 
There were only seven NSWO VGEP participants making definitive analysis 
difficult. The fact that VGEP was not statistically significant for NSWOs would support 
the null hypothesis that program participants are no more likely to leave the service 
before six years than their peers. There is a 12% cost premium associated with VGEP 
over non-participants estimated to be around $87,000 per officer. As with the Scholarship 
program for the pooled sample, it is the contention of the author that this increased cost 
may be largely offset by other improvements in human capital. VGEP is only marginally 
effective for the Nuclear SWO community. 
D. SUBMARINE WARFARE OFFICERS (NUCLEAR) 
Both graduate education programs were significant and positive, meaning they 
were an important factor in junior submariner retention. VGEP participants were 34.6% 
more likely than non-participants to remain in service, while Scholarship participants 
were over 30% more likely to remain in service. 
Bowman & Mehay (1999; 2002) found that, because of the high training costs 
associated with submarine officer development, the cost savings to the Navy of retaining 
submariners could be sizeable. It is the submarine community that is both the principal 
program participant and the most strongly affected by early graduate education. Within 
the submarine community, the Navy is definitely obtaining a significant return on the 
investment made in VGEP with a cost-savings slightly in excess of $100,000 per 
participant. Scholarship is estimated to cost an estimated $42,607 more than a non-
participant. However, the secondary human capital improvements could make the 
Scholarship program is marginally effective. 
E. SPECWAR/SPECOPS OFFICERS 
The retention effects of the VGEP and Scholarship programs were not statistically 
significant for Special Warfare/Ops officers. It is highly possible that the technical 
revolution of the 1990s and resultant civilian hiring spree simply passed by the SEAL and 
diving officers. Largely operational in nature, these two communities have relatively little 
exposure to, and possibly little interest in, technology in the form of computers, 
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communications and wireless information transfer, the skills which dominated the 
technology revolution. Attempting the same cost-estimations for this community yield a 
moderate net cost for VGEP and a sizeable loss for Scholarship ($55,000 and $221,000, 
respectively). However, the secondary human capital benefits could easily offset the net 
costs for the VGEP program. Scholarship specifically is a poor investment. 
F. ALL OTHER COMMUNITIES 
The officers grouped under the “Other Communities” variable were a very diverse 
group. Medical community officers dominated the group with 75 of 181 officers. The 
retention behavior of early education participants in all “other communities” was not 
statistically different from non-participants. The small numbers of officers in many of the 
communities classified as “Other Communities” prevented additional investigation into 
the retention patterns of support officers. 
As with the SpecWar/SpecOps communities, it is possible the technology 
revolution simply passed these support officers by. The largest group of officers in this 
diverse group were the medical officers which, from the researchers perspective, would 
not normally be expected to join the technology race. As with the SPEC community, it is 
difficult to financially justify either program in the Other Community group. Using 
previous logic, VGEP could be argued to be marginally effective since the early graduate 
education cost premium was only 12.4% ($69,000 per participant). Scholarship is clearly 
not effective, posting an estimated $278,000 net loss. 
G. RETENTION SUMMARY 
The estimated marginal retention effects of graduate education alone are 
summarized in Table 23. 
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Table 23 Graduate Education Retention Summary. 
VARIABLE MEAN LOGIT SIG MARGINAL 
Pooled Communities (N= 1013) EFFECT 
VGEP 0.06 1.203 0.001 0.262 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.13 1.195 0.000 0.261 
SWO (N= 195) 
VGEP 0.0718 1.991 *** 0.408 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0769 0.698 0.323 0.143 
NSWO (N= 92) 
VGEP 0.0761 1.037 0.322 0.258 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.12 1.845 0.050 0.459 
NSUB (N= 460) 
VGEP 0.0761 1.863 0.003 0.346 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.19 1.647 0.000 0.306 
SPECWAR/SPECOPS (N= 85) 
VGEP 0.0353 -1.093 0.518 -0.218 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0706 -0.597 0.550 -0.119 
All Other Communities (N= 181) 
VGEP 0.0331 -1.097 0.254 -0.267 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.0442 0.100 0.905 0.024 
 
For the pooled sample containing all 1013 officers in all communities, both 
VGEP and Scholarship participants were 26% more likely to remain in service until the 
six year point. For SWOs, VGEP added 40% to the retention likelihood. Nuclear SWOs 
in the Scholarship program had the greatest retention difference between participants and 
non-participants. The submarine community was perhaps the one most affected with both 
programs yielding over a 30% retention gain at the six-year point. 
Coupled with opportunity costs, these surprisingly large retention effects drove 
the financial model to a very large degree. However, some communities contained very 
limited samples of graduate education participants. Some apparent cost-inefficiencies can 
be explained by the fact that participants in those communities did not exhibit different 
retention behavior than non-participants but incurred costs which non-participants did not 
incur. As has been shown, the $163,871 Scholarship opportunity cost was significant, 
requiring a very sizeable retention increase to overcome. However, the analysis in this 
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thesis was not able to quantify the value of the additional human capital that was created 
by the early graduate education programs. This thesis, while not concentrating on the 
secondary human capital effects, attempted to make modest allowances for these factors 
by comparing a minimal net loss to the secondary benefits. Specifically, Pooled 
Community, NSWO, SPEC and Other Community VGEP participants fall into this 
category, as do Submariner Scholarship participants. It is unlikely that a negative “cost-
benefit” ratio would be obtained in these cases if the full range of benefits could be 
evaluated. 
H. COST SAVINGS 
The cost savings calculated in Chapter V are considerable. They are summarized 
in Table 24. For this sample, VGEP saved the Navy an average of $86,000 per officer in 
reduced attrition by the six year point. In strictly financial terms, the Scholarship program 
showed an estimated net loss of $58,994. At least one of the graduate education programs 
had a significantly positive effect on retention (with resultant cost savings) in every 
community, except the SpecWar/ SpecOps community and the “Other Community” 
grouping. 
For VGEP participants’ service, though it costs the government $42,607-$69,196 
more per officer than non-participants’ service, it can be argued they are worth more due 
to improved efficiency and ability to grasp their role in “the big picture” (Sarkesian, 
Williams, & Bryant, 1995). Scholarship was more difficult to economically justify as it 
currently exists due to large estimated cost-losses for three of the five community 
groupings. Only in the Nuclear SWO community did the Scholarship program show 
significant monetary returns on investment. For the submarine community, the additional 
human capital benefits may offset what would otherwise appear to be a cost-loss. The 
Nuclear SWO and Submarine communities sufficiently dominated the overall sample that 
it could be argued secondary that human capital effects may mitigate the apparent losses 
for the overall sample. However, the magnitude of losses in the SWO, 
SpecWar/SpecOps, and Other Communities groupings made this position tenuous at best. 
The positive, statistically significant, retention outcome for program participants 
demonstrates that offering early graduate education improves retention of the most 
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valuable officers. Statistically speaking, officers stayed who were otherwise expected to 
leave the Navy. This is beneficial to the Navy on several levels. 
Table 24 Cost Savings Per Officer by Community. 
  Cost per officer Cost Savings 
Pooled Communities 
VGEP (N=65) $434,764 $86,343  
Scholarship (N=127) $580,101 ($58,994)  
non-participant (N=821) $521,107 N/A 
SWO 
VGEP (N=14) $394,235 $94,098  
Scholarship (N=15) $732,500 ($244,167)  
non-participant (N=166) $488,333 N/A 
NSWO 
VGEP (N=7) $788,470 ($87,106) 
Scholarship (N=11) $580,101 $121,263  
non-participant (N=74) $701,364 N/A 
NSUB 
VGEP (N=35) $397,920 $100,245  
Scholarship (N=87) $540,772 ($42,607)  
non-participant (N=338) $498,165 N/A 
SPEC 
VGEP (N=3) $497,399 ($54,949) 
Scholarship (N=6) $663,675 ($221,225)  
non-participant (N=76) $442,450 N/A 
Other Communities 
VGEP (N=6) $626,355 ($69,196) 
Scholarship (N=8) $835,739 ($278,580)  
non-participant (N=167) $557,159 N/A 
 
First, the improved retention means more officers are available in the fleet and 
that fewer officers need to be recruited to fully man the fleet. Recruiting costs for officers 
are not inexpensive. Most often, officers are grown through NROTC or USNA, which are 
costly and time-consuming commissioning programs. Officer Candidate School (OCS) 
acts as a surge volume in the officer training pipeline, producing officers quickly and at a 
relatively low cost. Here, the costs are limited to recruiting and training but are still not 
trivial. 
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A second benefit of improved retention is the increased pool of candidates to fill 
senior Navy billets. The hallmark of a Navy career is command at sea. Retaining more 
high quality officers allows more selective screening for these critical posts. More highly 
qualified senior officers can have a significant impact on Navy retention within their own 
commands, further improving the retention situation at all staffing levels.  Offering 
programs like early graduate education and other distinctive rewards recognizes high 
performers and leads to job satisfaction, retaining our best officers (Sarkesian, Williams 
& Bryant, 1995). 
The cost analysis determined that the Navy’s cost-per-officer was significantly 
lower for early graduate education programs than for non-participants. The improved 
retention in all warfare areas, except Special Warfare and Special Operations more than 
covered the cost to the government. The limited number of graduate education 
participants in the SpecWar/SpecOps and Other Community groupings may have 
accounted for the insignificant results in these communities. 
Based on demonstrated positive retention effects of the most prized USNA 
graduates, it is difficult to conclude that the VGEP and Scholarship programs are not 
effective for retention. When the costs of this retention are estimated, a more accurate 
picture of the programs effectiveness is created. Compared to a non-participating officer, 
the cost of offering an officer early graduate education is high. However, when the cost 
of an officer receiving early graduate education is compared to an officer receiving 
graduate education later in his/her career, a more positive picture can be painted. In either 
case, graduate education does not come cheaply. For a relatively small financial and time 
input, the Navy is able to utilize an officer with a graduate degree for the duration of their 
fleet service without incurring higher costs later in the officer’s career. 
Though not analyzed in thus study, the ability of an officer to obtain a graduate 
degree early in the career could potentially be more significant for aviators who undergo 
rigorous, expensive flight training and find it difficult to “leave the cockpit” for a tour to 
obtain a graduate degree. The positive effects of having a graduate degree have been 
demonstrated by numerous retention and promotion studies. Because flying skills atrophy 
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over time and aviators need to accumulate total flight hours, having a graduate degree 
prior to entering aviation service may be the best way to provide a graduate degree to this 
community. 
The results of thus study should provide an underestimate of the true net benefits 
of the graduate education programs. First, the time period coincides with a growing 
civilian economy where highly qualified officers were in high demand. Second, all 
possible costs have been included in the cost-analysis. It was not possible to include 
certain training costs to the overall cost of training an officer. Since (except for the 
SpecWar/SpecOps community, SWO Scholarship and NSWO VGEP) all warfare areas 
showed that early graduate education improved retention, including these costs would 
have added to the net effectiveness of the programs. Third, the value of an officer having 
an early graduate degree and not having to leave the community later (therefore allowing 
skills to atrophy) was not evaluated. Finally, the whole argument of human capital theory 
that production improvements should be associated with graduate education was largely 
ignored. The officers participating in early graduate education often have additional skills 
that can be utilized during their initial fleet tour. 
Fleet returnee officers, especially those with the academic background of those in 
this study, can expect an opportunity to obtain a graduate degree at some point in their 
career, often after their initial sea tour. Few will accomplish a Master's degree at a cost 
under the $10,000 threshold set for the VGEP program. Almost none will meet the zero 
cost to the government of the Scholarship program, especially in the technical disciplines 
that make up the large majority of majors for which scholarships are awarded. The 
Graduate Education Voucher limit is $40,000, and the USNA LEAD program runs 
$20,000 for a single-year, non-technical Master's degree program. Though estimates vary 
by program, Naval Postgraduate School resident programs can exceed $160,000, 
exclusive of pay and allowance costs (Gates, Maruyama, Powers, Rosenthal, & Cooper, 
1998, p. 14). 
I. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When comparing the cost-effectiveness of the two programs, it is important to 
note that the programs are fundamentally different. VGEP is a one year program which 
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starts during a Midshipman's First Class year and continues six months after USNA 
graduation. Due to the short length of time available to complete the degree, most of the 
participants are necessarily non-technical majors. Scholarship starts immediately after 
USNA graduation and runs for 24 months. A majority of Scholarship participants are 
technical majors such as chemistry or engineering. With the difference in major 
concentrations, it is not likely that many Scholarship participants could complete a 
Master's degree within the VGEP program. Thus, both programs are required to obtain 
the requisite mix of majors sought in fleet officers. While VGEP seems to be the more 
cost-effective program in this study, it would not be possible to obtain the same mix of 
majors using only VGEP. 
Several recommendations are made to maximize the return on investment for the 
VGEP and Scholarship programs: First, the concurrent service obligations for 
commissioning and graduate education allow officers to avoid up to two years of fleet 
service by selecting for an early graduate education program. Using a consecutive service 
requirement would double the MSR incurred by most participants. The possibility of such 
a large service commitment might prevent midshipmen from applying for the programs. 
However, the retention success observed in this study does not support this option. A 
more moderate change is suggested, especially for the Scholarship program where the 
opportunity cost was relatively high due to two years of missed fleet service. In order to 
minimize any adverse effects on program applications, while attempting to maximize 
potential service returns, it is recommended that one year of service be added for every 
year of graduate education. This would translate into a seven year MSR for most of the 
program participants in this study and would spread program costs over six years instead 
of four.  
The nuclear community was observed to benefit most from early graduate 
education. Setting aside additional quotas for these communities would allow more 
officers from these communities the opportunity to obtain a Master's degree and 
hopefully enlarge the body of officers attending early graduate education and remaining 
in service with their expensive training and experience. 
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The current cost of a Master's degree obtained at the University of Maryland is 
approaching the $10,000 government-funding cap placed on VGEP participants and will 
likely exceed this cap within a couple years (University of Maryland, 2002; Kiehl & 
Craig, 2003, p. A1). Most prestigious private universities’ fees already exceed this cap by 
a significant margin. Retention analysis supports substantially increasing the funding 
assistance provided to VGEP students. This would amount to a minimal increase in total 
program costs since most of the current costs come in the form of participant’s pay and 
allowances. 
By instruction, Scholarship students are required to secure scholarships which 
exceed 25% of tuition and fees (CNO, 1998, p. 3). For a prestigious private university, a 
minimal scholarship can still leave tens of thousands of dollars in unpaid education 
expenses for Scholarship students. Retention analysis supports expanding this program, 
even at moderate government expense. By offering some sort of reimbursement for 
tuition and fees not covered by scholarships, significant financial burdens could be lifted 
from affected students which may later influence their decision to leave the Navy in 
search of higher salaries. One way to do this at minimal government expense would be to 
allow Scholarship recipients to receive Navy tuition assistance (TA) to cover expenses 
not covered by scholarships. Even moderate direct education costs assumed by the 
government would only minimally affect the overall cost of the program. As with VGEP, 
the majority of the Scholarship program cost is accounted for by student pay, allowances. 
Lastly, cost analysis for Naval Academy graduates shows VGEP to be an 
effective program. With a minimal increase in MSR in return for graduate education, it 
could be made even more cost effective. Scholarship produces desirable retention results 
though at a considerably greater cost. The Scholarship program is open to NROTC 
graduates, but there are few available quotas and they are tightly controlled. Instituting a 
limited program covering NROTC graduates, as well as possibly OCS graduates, might 
be cost-effective. Relaxing restrictions on the number of NROTC graduate education 
quotas may have a similar effect on officer retention from that source with potential cost 




One significant limitation of this study is the time period chosen for analyzing 
retention decisions. The results of this study reflect retention decisions at MSR + 1 year. 
Applicability of results to different time spans will have to be determined by future 
research. The results of this study could be validated, negated, accentuated or attenuated 
by estimating a similar retention model at a later point in an officer's career. 
Another limitation is that only commissioned USNA graduates with five year 
MSRs are examined. Aviation and Marine Corps program participants were not analyzed. 
Finally, the results of this study are applicable only to USNA graduates. Due to 
the unique selection criteria applicable to USNA, study results may not fully apply to 
NROTC or OCS accession sources. 
K. FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several areas where further research would benefit the analysis of early 
graduate education. It remains to be determined to what extent midshipmen are applying 
for early graduate education programs to avoid fleet service time. This would likely 
involve a survey of those who applied for the programs. Also, what are the characteristics 
of the officers accepting graduate education who separated? 
This thesis centered on Navy officers who attended a civilian university under the 
VGEP or Scholarship program. In order to determine the effects of the civilian 
environment on military officers, it may be beneficial to track these officers’ career 
patterns. Are there performance differences between civilian graduate degree recipients 
and government-sponsored programs (NPS, NWC, etc.)? Selection and promotion rates 
could be analyzed to determine if there are differences in patterns for both groups. 
The model was unable to determine how the civilian unemployment rate for 
college graduates affects officer retention? Retention rates and bonus manipulations 
could be compared against fluctuations in the civilian unemployment rate for college 
graduates. 
Do civilian graduate education programs affect the “military-civilian gap” within 
the academic and educational community? To determine this would require surveys of 
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both the military and civilian (student and faculty) populations. Attitudes could be 
compared for those with no interaction and those who experienced civilian/military 
interaction in an academic environment. 
Lastly, what officer characteristics can be solely attributed to graduate education 
and isolated from those qualities inherent in officers selected for graduate education? 
This would require access to students both before and after their graduate education 
experience. Attitudes taken from the students could be analyzed along with 
senior/subordinate comments about the student’s performance and job accomplishment, 
both before and after the graduate education experience. 
L. CONCLUSION 
Based on retention data both VGEP and Scholarship programs appear to be well 
run with participants selected who will repay the investment made in graduate education 
in the form of retention. Based on the costs involved, moderate increases in retention do 
not always amount to cost savings, especially for the Scholarship program where over 
$160,000 in opportunity costs need to be overcome. With the above recommended 
changes to the programs, it is believed based on the results of this study that early 
graduate education opportunities could be safely expanded in a limited manner without 
unduly threatening the positive results found. The cost effectiveness of the VGEP 
program within the submarine community and the Scholarship program within the 
Nuclear SWO community was especially high. Expanding early graduate education 
opportunities in a moderate fashion could significantly affect retention of junior officers, 
especially in the SWO and NSWO communities where observed retention was well 
below that of the submarine community and pooled community sample. 
Based on the largely significant retention results and the net benefits of the early 
graduate education programs, it is recommended that the USNA Graduate Education 
Committee continue basing selecting of applicants on the current criteria. VGEP and 
Scholarship are not awarded strictly on the basis of OOM. Many factors are considered 
when selecting participants and the higher retention rates through the overall sample as 
well as in various communities suggests that the USNA Graduate Education Committee 
(GEC) is doing a remarkable job of selecting candidates who will return the investment 
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made in them by the Navy. It is also recommended that the US Naval Academy 
Academic Dean, Graduate Education Committee, and Ms. Marjorie Roxburgh continue 
to pursue additional VGEP funding and Scholarship authorizations from the Navy 
Personnel Bureau in a concerted effort to expand both programs. 
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION LOGITS 
  Pooled communities SWO only NSWO only 
VARIABLE Logit Signif Logit Signif Logit Signif
Grad Ed: 
VGEP 1.203 0.001 1.991 *** 1.037 0.322
SCHOLARSHIP 1.195 0.000 0.698 0.323 1.845 0.050
Demographics: 
GENDER 0.261 0.301 -0.313 0.529 0.199 0.845
MINORITY 0.344 0.233 N/A N/A N/A N/A
ATHLETE 0.012 0.945 -0.219 0.566 -0.158 0.833
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 -0.220 0.193 -0.088 0.841 1.430 0.036
GROUP3 -0.251 0.194 -0.154 0.709 -0.117 0.855
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB 0.150 0.469 N/A N/A N/A N/A
NSWO -0.816 0.003 N/A N/A N/A N/A
SPEC 0.150 0.608 N/A N/A N/A N/A
OCOMM -0.435 0.064 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 -0.651 0.034 -0.795 0.411 -1.938 0.178
YR89 -0.811 0.005 -1.964 0.007 N/A N/A
YR90 -0.639 0.032 -1.485 0.071 -1.261 0.545
YR92 -0.195 0.547 -0.799 0.319 -0.760 0.766
YR93 -0.806 0.010 -1.642 0.047 -1.992 0.366
YR94 -0.759 0.015 -0.504 0.553 -1.344 0.953
YR95 -0.342 0.276 -0.189 0.822 0.415 0.208
YR96 0.090 0.800 -0.765 0.314 N/A N/A
Constant 1.144 0.000 1.798 0.008 0.436 0.431
Survey Statistics: 
Model Chi-square 86.299 23.86 24.874 
-2 log likelihood 1210.547 221.515 102.622 
Number of Cases 1013 195 92 
Classification: 
% Correct "0" 72.9 30.2 68.9 
% Correct "1" 53.1 89.4 72.3 
% Correct Total 59.8 70.3 70.7 
*** Significant with single-tail calculation    
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION LOGITS (Continued) 
 
 
  NSUB only SPEC only Other Communities
VARIABLE Logit Signif Logit Signif Logit Signif
Grad Ed: 
VGEP 1.863 0.003 -1.093 0.518 -1.097 0.254
SCHOLARSHIP 1.647 0.000 -0.597 0.550 0.100 0.905
Demographics: 
GENDER N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.080 0.835
MINORITY -0.679 0.077 N/A N/A 0.600 0.349
ATHLETE 0.030 0.915 0.463 0.438 0.347 0.348
Other (GROUP 1 omitted): 
GROUP2 -0.408 0.113 -0.666 0.342 -0.425 0.296
GROUP3 -0.130 0.721 -0.245 0.690 -0.562 0.259
Community (SWO omitted): 
NSUB N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
NSWO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SPEC N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
OCOMM N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Year (1991 omitted): 
YR88 -0.744 0.135 -1.956 0.067 0.634 0.378
YR89 -1.007 0.032 -1.973 0.061 0.533 0.421
YR90 -0.604 0.213 -1.593 0.139 -0.470 0.478
YR92 0.139 0.816 -1.531 0.133 -0.236 0.724
YR93 -0.853 0.105 N/A N/A -0.949 0.125
YR94 -0.997 0.053 -1.686 0.086 -0.679 0.379
YR95 -0.622 0.262 -0.983 0.342 -1.213 0.083
YR96 0.254 0.735 0.162 0.909 0.006 0.994
Constant 1.423 0.001 2.175 0.011 0.782 0.174
Survey Statistics:   
Model Chi-square 53.647 10.776 20.090 
-2 log likelihood 494.121 93.904 227.899 
Number of Cases 460 85 181 
Classification:   
% Correct "0" 59.2 34.6 78.5 
% Correct "1" 65.2 93.2 48 
% Correct Total 63.5 75.3 61.3 
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